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The Yugoslav People's Army is a function of the defense
needs of a medium size state and the political needs of a
communist regime attempting to unite a multiethnic society.
This study examines four areas of the Yugoslav military
system. It examines the factors which have influenced the
development of the "total national defense" concept which
Yugoslavia is using to integrate its citizenry into the
active defense of the country. It examines the relationship
between the operational army and the territorial defense
units, the major components of total national defense. It
examines the political role of the army in support of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia. And, it examines the
Yugoslav arms industry as influenced by defense needs,
economic realities, and foreign policy.
The army leadership recognizes that their most
important task is the preservation of the Yugoslav state and
they have made a commitment to support the post-Tito efforts





II. TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE 13
III. YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TERRITORIAL
DEFENSE 44
IV. THE ARMY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 64
V. ARMS TRANSFERS 84
VI. CONCLUSIONS 100
BIBLIOGRAPHY 106
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 112

I. INTRODUCTION
The Yugoslav People's Army is a function of the defense
needs of a medium size state and the political needs of a
communist regime attempting to unite a multiethnic society.
Yugoslavia has been a dividing line between the Soviet and
Western blocs since 1948 and has had to struggle to defend
its position as an independent state in the world community.
This struggle has been both external, in the country's
efforts to resist superpower pressure, and internal, to
blend the particular and often divergent needs of its
member republics. The physical security requirements to
defend Yugoslavia have had to adjust to the limited
resources of a medium size state. The Party's efforts to
balance regional-ethnic autonomy with centralized nation-
building has coopted the army into the political decision-
making process. An outgrowth of these conditions has been
the present organization of the Yugoslav People's Army.
This study examines four areas of the Yugoslav military
system. It examines the factors which have influenced the
development of the "total national defense" concept Yugo-
slavia is using to integrate its citizenry into the active
defense of the country. It examines the relationship between
the operational army and the territorial defense units, the
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major components of total national defense. It examines the
political role of the army in support of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia. And, it examines the Yugoslav
arms industry as influenced by defense needs, economic
realities, and foreign policy.
Yugoslavia is roughly the size of Wyoming, but its
strategic location on the Balkan Peninsula has increased
its importance in the world geopolitical arena. World
events in the late 1940s forced Yugoslavia to adopt a
foreign policy of nonalignment , a position it was not
particularly prepared to assume. As Yugoslav pragmatism
adjusted to the new arrangement, however, Yugoslavia became
a spokesman for independent underdeveloped countries in a
bipolar international system. These are contributing
reasons for Yugoslavia's importance today; had it remained
under the Soviet sphere of influence it would probably be
no more important than Bulgaria or Romania.
The ability of Yugoslavia to remain nonaligned in its
political affiliations, now that President Tito is dead,
depends a great deal upon the succession of power and the
ability of the new government to maintain internal stability,
The succession of power is being handled by rotating the
leadership every year among the members of the Presidency
of Yugoslavia (a system introduced in 1971 and modified
in the 1974 constitution) . The constantly changing leader-
ship, however, may fail to provide consistent, cohesive

direction for internal policies and the strength of Yugo-
slavia's foreign policy role may wane without the continuity
of proven and known leadership. While Yugoslavia's reputa-
tion and influence as an international spokesman may suffer
if it fails to maintain its image among the developing
countries, its survival as an independent communist state
may cease if instability resulting from internal bitter dis-
putes occurs.
The state of mind in Yugoslavia varies between the
nationalities which make up each of the eight regions in the
country. In efforts to avoid repeating the policies of the
pre-Second World War government which exacerbated the ethnic
differences, the communist regime established a federation
which provided considerable autonomy to the ethnic groups
while supporting a movement toward a strong central govern-
ment and dissolution of ethnic, religious, and cultural
differences. Once realized that this approach was basically
unacceptable to the republics, Yugoslav leaders began
emphasizing decentralization in domestic, political and
economic affairs. The expectation is that the unity of
Yugoslavia can best be secured through governmental respect
for ethnic diversity. A proportional representation can
be observed within the government, army, and the League of
Communists and the principles of ethnic equality can be
observed in the policies of the federal government.
10

Major regional inequalities, however, still exist in
Yugoslavia and there is no agreed-upon program to improve
conditions in the underdeveloped regions of the country.
Conflicting federal policies continue to divide the Yugoslav
peoples and confound governmental planners attempting to
achieve both optimal growth and inter-regional equality. The
one integrating force stressing the ethic of "inter-national"
cooperation is the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
In the event of post-Tito difficulties, the League of
Communists will be the main force capable of holding the
federation together. A major power behind this force is the
Yugoslav People's Army. The army supports the goals of the
party and its continuing attempts to develop the country.
It is unlikely, therefore, that the leaders of the army and
security apparatus, which essentially has a tendency to
favor patriotism and order, will permit others to deviate
from Party policy. It is within this framework, the army
subordinate to the Party, that the army is a cohesive force
in the country.
The Communist Party of Yugoslav changed its name to the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952 during the 6th
Party Congress. The role of the Party was redefined to be the
"conscience" of progressive change rather than the "vanguard,"
Edvard Kardel j , cited in Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav





and the name was changed to symbolize the new role. I have
used the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia" and the
"Party" interchangeably throughout this study.
The Yugoslav People's Army consists of three compon-
ents: the land army, the air and air defense forces, and
the navy. I have used the "army" in its generic sense in
this study and have used it interchangeably with "opera-





II. TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE
Historically, the survival of a nation-state has depend-
ed upon the country's ability to defend itself. The desire
alone to maintain its form of government has not proven
sufficient when countries have been faced with an invading
force from abroad or a dissident group from within. All
forms of national government have taken measures, therefore,
to provide for their defense, and there are few countries
where the ties between the defense establishment and the
political structure are as strong as they are in Yugoslavia.
The geopolitical location of Yugoslavia has played a major
role in developing these ties, as has the form of communism
which has evolved in the country since the end of the Second
World War. In an effort to create a socialist government
that met the particular demands of a multinational state,
the Yugoslav leadership has developed a defense structure
that allows for the national character of each of its
republics and provinces to participate in Yugoslavia's
defense. At the same time, the government maintains a
centrally controlled defensive arm which insures national
unity. This chapter will trace and discuss the reasons
for the development of the Yugoslav concept of opstenavodna
odbvana or what is known as "total national defense."
13

Defense preparations in Yugoslavia proceed from the
premise that small and medium-size states must be self-
reliant in defense, if they are to maintain their
sovereignty. Provided they have suitable military
institutions and the national will to support them, such
states can successfully resist and quite possibly prevent
2
external attack, even by a superpower. Following self-
reliance and independence, to secure its defense, Yugoslav
3
military policy is derived from four basic principles.
Yugoslavia insists upon national sovereignty, it has refused
to join any political-military bloc, it espouses inter-
national political non-alignment, and it has assumed a
nonaggressive, nonprovocatory military stance.
To demonstrate its purely defensive nonprovocatory
intentions, Yugoslavia emphasizes a territorial defense
force in its invasion-deterrent structure. The organiza-
tional premise of self-reliance is that all able-bodied
citizens mobilize to defend the country and transform the
country into a veritable hornets' nest for any enemy force.
2Dusan Dozet, "The influence of International Relations
on the Concept of General People's Defense," The Yugoslav
Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Medjunarodna
Politika, 1970) , p. 126.
3Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and
Non-NATO Europe (Santa Monica, CA. : The Rand Corporation,
February 1973), p. 27.
14

The territorial defense concept is nonaggressive, in that
the force is latent, relatively lightly armed, and locally
assigned. The force is bound to the geography of its own
country and, being weak in offensive armament, it is unsuit-
4
able for intervention abroad. Such a force cannot strike
at the enemy's homeland and, therefore, does not pose an
offensive threat to its neighbors. Territorial defense
forces are principally infantry in their tactical and
support forces, designed to frustrate a mobile enemy force
and deny the enemy access to key terrain.
A territorial defense force is unable to destroy an
invading force by itself. Yugoslavia's defense thinking,
therefore, is strongly influenced by the presence of super-
power military blocs on either side of it. The Yugoslavs do
not believe that a state of 22 million people could success-
fully resist an unlimited attack by a superpower entirely on
its own. But they assert that by placing a primary emphasis
on self-defense efforts, it can benefit from the superpowers
balancing each other off without Yugoslavia being forced into
5
an unwanted military alliance. Yugoslavia, therefore, feels
4 ...
Jon L. Lellenberg, Overview of the Citizen-Army
Concept (Menlo Park, CA. : Stanford Research Institute,
October, 1972), p. 30.




free to emphasize territorial defense under the assumption
that an aggressor on its territory will have to reckon with
the aggressor's opposing bloc's forces. An invader would
have to guard against intervention by the other superpower.
Yugoslavia, then, relies on an inoffensive deterrent by way
of territorial defense. In a speech at Belgrade during the
Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1951, Tito expressed this view of
superpowers balancing each other:
In the West there are voices which say that
Yugoslavia is in danger and that an attack
against Yugoslavia would imply the grave
threat of a wider conflict. This does us no
harm; on the contrary; since it is a question
of our security and since it diminishes the
gpossibility of anyone's deciding to attack.
A consideration that has played as important a role in
the Yugoslav decision to place a heavy reliance upon the
territorial defense concept is the fact that the peacetime
budgetary cost of a largely latent logistics support of a
territorial unit is lower than that of an operating or
combat-ready logistics support of a standing force of the
7 . .
same wartime strength. Among the political and economic
pressures placed on defense structures is their high cost,
gJosip Broz Tito speaking on 16 February 1951,
Documents on International Affairs 1951 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p. 379.
7Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political , Socio-
Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," The Yugoslav
Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade: Mejunarodna
Politika, 1970) , p. 216.
16

and territorial forces recommend themselves as being
relatively inexpensive. The peacetime budgetary cost of
a short-term military-trained individual who requires
supplemental training each year is considerably less than
that of a full-time professional soldier. Therefore, any
defense program which can keep the level of professional
soldiers at a minimum and still provide adequate national
defense is more suitable to a small country with a small
national budget.
The overall peacetime cost between a force that is
largely of the territorial type can be dramatically compared
with that of a largely standing field army type by the
following examples. Switzerland supports a wartime force of
about 640,000 men which is capable of being mobilized in
approximately 48 hours with an annual peacetime budget of
o
$1.6 billion. The Federal Republic of Germany supports a
wartime force of about 1,250,000 men with an annual budget
9
of $17.3 billion. That comes to $2,500 per year per Swiss
soldier and $14,000 per year per West German soldier. This
shows a 1 to 6 cost comparison which demonstrates the
economic advantage of a largely territorial defense-oriented
o
The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London: The Inter-






force. While the force capabilities or defensive require-
ments of these two armies are not comparable, both are
providing sufficient defense for their respective countries.
Given the circumstances of Yugoslavia and the understanding
that the defense budget competes with other budgets for
resources, Yugoslavia is able to take advantage of its
geopolitical position and the less expensive form of defense
- the reliance on territorial defense forces.
The Yugoslav defense doctrine has included the use of
partisan-type territorial defense since the success Yugo-
slavia achieved from its use in the Second World War. After
1948 however, the thought on military problems was that the
territorial forces and the partisan method of waging war were
more or less considered as auxiliary forms of the armed forces
and reduced, in substantial part, to their tactical values.
By the end of 1951, in view of the threat of a Soviet inva-
sion, following the rift in relations between the two
countries, Yugoslavia had increased its army to 42 divisions
and had about half a million men under arms; the army was
fully operational at this time, not a guerrilla organization.
Josip Broz Tito speech, Yugoslav Facts and Views
(New York: Yugoslav Information Center, No. 108, February
1977) .
The New York Time (December 22, 1951).
18

Tito stressed Yugoslavia's determination to defend its
borders and not to retreat to the mountains. Additionally,
because of the army's ability to defend the country, it was
insulting, Tito claimed, to say that the Yugoslav army was
12
only suited for guerrilla fighting.
It was recognized, however, that partisan units might
be required in the event of an attack, so plans were prepared
13for their deployment. The concept of partisan units
remained in the defense doctrine and was demonstrated in
the 1953 mass military maneuvers, when partisan units were
14incorporated into the operations. The period 1958-1959
saw a significant turning point in the development of the
concept of national defense, after the principles and
advantages of guerrilla warfare were re-innovated and the
doctrine of combined open and partisan warfare were adopted.
At this stage of development, however, the partisan
units were formed within the Yugoslav People's Army and
were not scheduled to be brought to full wartime strength
12
The New York Time (December 22, 1951).
13Milojica Pantelic, "The System and Organization of
National Defense," Yugoslav Survey , Belgrade, Vol. X, No. 2
(May 1969)
, p. 1.
14Robert B. Asprey, "Tito's Army," Marine Corps Gazette ,
Quantico, Vol. 41, No. 7 (July 1957), p. 48.
19

and mobilization until after a conflict had begun. It was
not until later that work organizations and socio-political
communities were given a defensive role in the country,
beyond that of civil defense.
Concurrent with the recognized role of partisan units,
however, was a reduction in defense capabilities which
followed from the 1955 beginning of improved Soviet-Yugoslav
relations. By 1968 the Yugoslav People's Army was down to
some 200,000 men, and defense expenditures had fallen from
a high of 22 percent of the national income to less than six
*
16percent.
The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 established a federal
state on the Soviet model and the USSR Constitution of 1936.
After the 1948 break with the Soviet Union, however, Yugoslav
leaders presented principles of self-management and the
subsequent decentralization to justify Yugoslavia's exist-
ence outside of the socialist model it had tried so hard to
live with. Basing self-management on the principles of
Milojica Pantelic, "The Role of the Armed Forces in
the System of National Defense," Yugoslav Survey , Belgrade,
Vol. X, No. 4 (November 1969).
16
A. Ross Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia
(Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1971) , p. 2.
17Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New York:
The Viking Press, 1971), p. 293.
20

gave socialist justification for their actions, but it was
only after the announcement of workers' self-management in
1950 that federalism was actually implemented. The break
with Moscow opened the eyes of the Yugoslav leaders to what
Edvard Kardelj termed "the danger of bureaucratic
centralism. n
The main outline of the self-management system evolved
during the period 1950-1954, which began a period of extreme
decentralization in many respects. In the economy, where
most of the changes were taking place, the elimination of
direct federal controls plus the wide autonomy for local
governments, went so far as to produce an abundance of
autonomous economic units and what would later be viewed
as extreme forms of localism.
With the implementation of the self-management system,
the first major steps toward decentralization of economic
19decision-making began with the 1957-1961 five year plan.
The transfer of authority that occurred in the late 1950'
s
was primarily from the federal authorities to republic and
local government organs in relation to major economic policy
decisions. These regarded the location of new industries
18George W. Hoffman and Fred W. Neal, Yugoslavia and
the New Communism (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962)
p. 211.
19Fred B. Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 150.
21

and production methods, marketing, and production planning
in enterprises. The five-year economic plans were actually
planning guides for the economy, because the federal govern-
ment frequently interfered in the operation of the market
by subsidizing unprofitable enterprises, directing
investment resources according to social and political
rather than economic criteria, establishing some commodity
prices, and so on.
The contradictions of decentralization arose partly
from the struggle between reformers and the more conserva-
tive elements, who saw their positions threatened by the
abandonment of the old policies within the decision-making
bodies. To control the rate of decentralization in the
economy, the conservatives were able to control, at least
indirectly, the allocation of investments by restricting
the accumulation of capital and restricting the use of
investment funds.
After the first decade of workers' self-management,
the gain in experience led in the early 1960's to the
widening of the concept to include all aspects of public
20life. The term "social self-management" was used to
indicate that workers in publicly-owned enterprises, as in
20 Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 270
22

the past, and participants in all other forms of social
activity, cultural, political, or recreational, had the
right to govern themselves. A new constitution was drafted
in 1959 to incorporate this concept into society, and was
adopted in 1963.
Enterprises were given more decision-making authority
at the expense of republic and federal government agencies,
and the republics were given more authority at the expense
21
of the federal government. The unified market, however,
along with other basic unifying principles, remained.
Republics were not permitted to erect barriers between
themselves to impede or hinder the free flow of capital,
goods, and labor. Common laws regarding foreign trade,
customs, duties, etc., were also retained along with a
common currency. The basic principles of self-management
and of the socialist economic and political systems remained
unchanged, and they also were held in common by all republics
The federal government was charged with responsibility for
the economically backward regions of the country, and held
the power to raise taxes to pay for these services. A
complicated system of checks and balances was established,
21Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 271
23

which required the agreement of the republics to any
extension of federal powers.
The 1963 constitution restructured the Federal
Assembly and gave increasing power to various economic and
social interests by giving them representation in newly
22
established, indirectly elected chambers. The principle
of rotation of incumbents in office was introduced, and the
separation of the party and the state was advanced by a rule
that prohibited the simultaneous holding by one individual
of high state and party office. This applied to everyone,
except Tito.
Even though decentralization had been formally
promulgated and reform was being implemented, there was no
immediate success with the programs nor was the concept
accepted by everyone. Unemployment was growing and the
standard of living, particularly for the least well paid,
23
was falling. The role of the state in the redistribution
of national income was reduced, and prices were permitted
to respond to supply and demand. Certain economic sectors
had been unfairly penalized by altered price ratios or other
reform measures.
22 .Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia, p. 271.




Those in leading or middle-level positions in the party,
state, and economic apparatuses, who had felt deep-seated
reservations before the new reforms were adopted, were not
willing to wait for the reforms to fail completely to be
24 ...proven right. Those in positions who were opposed to the
new reforms sought surreptitiously to undermine the efforts
to change. It was evident that the reforms would never
really be implemented, unless those in opposition could be
disciplined or removed from the positions which enabled
them to block the reforms. The group opposed favored strong
centralized government with a communist bent for economic
development stressing conspicuous and expensive investment
projects.
Tito had refrained for a time from speaking out against
the anti-reform group by name but only referred to its
members as "bureaucratic and etatist forces" and "class
25
enemies." In July 1966, however, Tito decided that an
end had to come to the anti-reform movement and he forced
the resignation of Aleksandar Rankovic, Vice-President of
Yugoslavia, for being part of a factional group engaged in
24 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974,
p. 180.
25 Ibid, p. 184.
25

in a struggle for power, against economic reforms, and
opposed to the programs of decentralization.
The ousting of Rankovic signified a beginning of
the liberalization trend. The State Security Service,
which had been an extension of Rankovic' s power, underwent
a reorganization and a new director was appointed. But the
sentiment against the State Security Service as a strong
central government agency began to affect other centralized
agencies. The Army began to fall under scrutiny as well,
even though it had helped in the removal of Rankovic.
A year earlier, when major reforms were being
implemented, the federal budget was supposed to have been
26
reduced to include a cut in defense expenditures. In
fact, however, the cut in defense spending was never made,
and the 1966 budget called for an increase in defense
spending. Six months after the dismissal of Rankovic, in
December 1966, parliamentary discussion on the defense
27budget for 1967 was particularly critical. The deputies
eventually agreed to pass the defense budget, but with a
recommendation that the Defense Ministry take into
26
Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-19744
, p. 117
27
"Yugoslavia to Reform its Armed Forces," The Times
(December 29, 1966), p. 6; London.
26

consideration all the objections voiced by the National
Assembly committees on excessive spending by the military.
Up until that time, the defense budget usually had been
approved without discussion. Since then, matters not
adversely affecting the security of the army or the state
have been subject to public discussion and parliamentary
control. The army had had its way for over 20 years, and
now it was being told to adjust to the country's economic
needs and to do with less than what it wanted. Discussions
about the army, an institution which before then had been
closed to public control, gave further evidence that the
reforms, though mainly economic, had political implications.
This amounted in effect to a public confrontation between
the military point of view and that of the reformists.
Under growing pressure from younger industrial managers
and administrative technocrats, the army leaders were com-
pelled to decrease defense expenditures while still meeting
the defense requirements of the country. To comply with
contemporary defense requirements, the army announced plans
to reorganize to an operational force capable of resisting
the first strike and a territorial force of people's army
under the scheme of a "total national defense system."
The State Secretariat for National Defense proposed
to the Federal Assembly in 1966 that a new Law on National




"general-popular" defense war. The concept required the
organization and preparation not only of the military, but
also the civil organs and organizations, as well as every
citizen, for the defense of the country. The reorganiza-
tion of the army was to be carried out in 1967 and was to
cut back on the size of the regular army to a small
operational force remaining under the unified federal
command. Each republic then would have its own territorial
army under local command, and with a distinctly local
character.
The regular armed forces provided a solid core around
which the irregular partisan forces could form. The Yugo-
slav People's Army maintains its integral place in strategic
planning which allowed military planners to think in terms
of a mixed forces, combining elements of both traditional
and guerrilla strategies.
The operational army continues to be regarded
as the backbone, the principle component of
national defense. It alone is capable, in terms
of its weapons, technical equipment, power,
mobility, organization, and trained cadres, to




The Times (December 29, 1966); London.
29Jovan Radovanovic, "The Operational Army," The
Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade
Medjunarodna Politika, 1970), p. 271.
28

The Yugoslav military planners were cognizant of three
particular lessons which came out of the experiences of
the Second World War. While the amount of manpower which
the aggressor can devote is more or less fixed, the defense
can draw upon the greater resources of the entire country.
While the aggressor may enjoy marked superiority in material
factors, the resultant advantages can be neutralized by
various forms of unconventional opposition. And while the
aggressor may have an advantage in speed, in terms of time
and space, these will nevertheless be insufficient to exert
control over the occupied territory and population.
Territorial defense units were acknowledged as more
economical than massive conventional military buildups.
This was a major consideration because of the questionable
success of the 1965 economic reforms, the extensive demand
on Yugoslav resources, and the political undesirability
of outside assistance. The extensive decentralization
of the mid-1960' s had also added a domestic political
limitation, in the form of unwillingness of the non-Serbian
republics to see a reconcentration of power in Belgrade.
This was understandable, considering that 67 percent
30Andro Gabelic, "The Universal Substance of General
People's Defense," The Yugoslav Concept of General People's




of all positions in the federal organs of administration
were held by Serbs, who made up roughly 40 percent of the
31 . .total population. In the military, the Serbs made up
60 percent of the officers corps and 47 percent of all
general officers.
While several ranking military men began to recognize
the greater need for a total national defense, there were
among them those who still advocated strong central control.
The military claimed that the 1967 budget was below the
real needs of the services, but it was still scrutinized
and approved only begrudgingly by the federal assembly.
After the purging of Rankovic, many of these military men
began to be replaced. In May 1967 General Ivan Gosnjak lost
33his post as Secretary of National Defense and by the end
of the 1967 the new Secretary, General Nikola Ljubicic, had
committed himself to a significant change of emphasis in
defense policy. To replace the 1965 National Defense Law,
General Ljubicic announced:
31 Izborni Sistem u Uslovima Samoupravl janja (Belgrade
Institu Drustvenih Nauka, 1969)
, p. 104.
32 Zdenko Antic, "National Structure of the Yugoslav
Army Leadership," Radio Free Europe Research , No. 1373
(April 12, 1972) , p. 3.
33Adam Roberts, Nations In Arms (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1976), p. 158.
30

The present law does not fully reflect our concept
of national defense, the concept of conducting
a 'general-popular' defense war, which requires
the organization and preparation, not only of
the military but also of the civil organs and
organizations as well as the citizens, for the
defense of the country. The basic thing is to
tell, in a more specific way, every citizen,
every work organization or socio-political
community, where its place is and what is its
duty. The new law will elaborate more specific-
ally certain basic constitutional provisions.
Since 1967 the regular military establishment has
undergone an "opening to society." Military affairs came
to be discussed in public media as well as by the parlia-
ment. The changing character of the party and the proposal
to create republican military forces alongside the federal
army was paralleled by the evolution of Yugoslav constitu-
tional law. The constitution adopted in 1963, as amended
in 1967 and 1968, brought about a reorganization of the
central government, accompanied by an expansion of the rights
and responsibilities of the republics. The latter possessed
their own state prosecutors and shared with Belgrade control
over a much reduced security police. Together with the
federal government, the republics were responsible for civil
defense, and each republic was to have under the proposed
34Nikola Ljubicic, "Yugoslav National Defense," Survival ,
Vol. X, No. 2 (February 1968), p. 48.
31

military reorganization a territorial defense unit of its
35
own.
Despite the conflict between reformists and centralists
over the new role of the army, however, there were no
immediate changes made. The exact definition of roles had
to be worked out between the operational army and the
territorial units, and there was no sense of danger or crisis
3 6
to justify a major shake-up of the army. The political
implications of the reorganization of the army and the
relations among the nationalities and national groups in
Yugoslavia delayed the introduction and passage of the new
defense bill until after the unexpected Warsaw Pact invasion
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
Yugoslavia had traditionally tried to play off one bloc
against the other in an attempt to secure sufficient
latitude for its own particular brand of ideology and politi-
cal system. The alternating movements had been relatively
easy to identify, lasting a period of several years in each
of the superpowers' direction.
35
R. V. Burks, The National Problem and the Future of
Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, October
1971)
, p. 24.
Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 160.
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In the period immediately preceding the invasion of
Czechoslovakia there was little concern among Yugoslav
leaders about Soviet intentions. Tito and his aides were
37
warning about the threat posed by "Western imperialism. 1'
The Yugoslav military establishment conducted war games
oriented toward defense against an attack from the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, while the Yugoslav press was
writing about the U.S. conduct in Vietnam and the possi-
bility of another Middle East crisis. While Tito was
concerned about the posture of "Western imperialism," he
showed no alarm at the Warsaw Pact maneuvering on Czecho-
slovakia's borders, seen only as a measure to put new
pressure on the Prague government. Yugoslavia thus misread
the political situation in a surprisingly inept manner.
The Czech invasion was particularly shocking to Yugo-
slavia, because it undermined some assumptions the Yugoslavs
had made about the balance of forces in the world. Belgrade
felt that there had been a worldwide swing to the right
with U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and the possibility of
Soviet military involvement in another socialist country,
a repeat of 1956 in Hungary, had never been considered. The
37Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 93.
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Yugoslav leaders saw a Soviet foreign policy based on the
old principles of power politics and spheres of influence.
It was not inconceivable to the Yugoslavs that if the
Soviets were willing to pay the cost of their operation in
Czechoslovakia they might also invade Yugoslavia. By doing
so the Soviets could achieve three objectives: eliminate
a dangerous rival model of socialism as practiced by the
Yugoslavs, provide bases for the rapidly expanding Soviet
Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, and outflank NATO from the
38
southeast.
Other indications that the Soviet Union might invade
came from a briefing by the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to U.S. congressional leaders two days after
39the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The information
given to the press which emerged from the briefing concerned
Soviet troop movements, suggesting a "harassment or possible
invasion of Yugoslavia." Such a report had to be given
credibility, particularly since it was known that the man
who had been in charge of Czechoslovakia's military liaison
with the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Major General Jan Sejna,
38 Peter Nichols, "Fears of Russian Drive South," The
Times (October 9, 1968); London.
39 Louis Heren, "Soviet Troops Heading for Yugoslav
Border," The Times (August 26, 1968), p. 1.
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had defected to the West earlier that year and would have
known about such plans.
Additionally contributing to the Yugoslav leaders'
fear that their country's independence and territorial
sovereignty was threatened were articles such as the one in
Pravda which appeared one month after the Czech invasion:
It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist
country seeks to adopt a 'non-affiliated' stand
it, in actual fact, retains its national indepen-
dence precisely thanks to the might of the
socialist community, and above all the Soviet
Union as its central force, which also includes
the might of its armed forces. The weakening
of any of the links in the world socialist
system directly affects all the socialist
countries, which cannot look indifferently upon
this. -1
Upon mobilization after the Czech invasion, however,
the Yugoslavs found that they were unable to defend their
country. It was discovered that there were only two
Yugoslav customs officers and a few national policemen
standing in the way of the Soviet army. Vladimir Bakaric,
the communist party leader of Croatia, stated that the
Soviet Army could have punched through the Yugoslav
40Jeffrey Hart, "Soviet Plans for Balkans," The San
Francisco Examiner (April 8, 1974), p. 31.
41Sergei Kovalyov, "Sovereignty and International
Duties," Pravda (September 26, 1968), as translated in
Survival, Vol. X, No. 11 (November 1968), p. 375.
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defenses to Zagreb in six hours and to the Adriatic coast
in 12 hours.
An outcome of the detailed inspection of the country's
defenses resulted in the acceptance of the new strategic
concept of total national defense, which was unsuccessfully
opposed by some circles in the professional army. Another
outcome of faulty strategic planning was the purge of nine
top generals on orders of President Tito. The purged
officers, including the deputy chairman of the National
Defense Council, General Ivan Goshnjak, who had been
relieved as Secretary of National Defense two years earlier,
and the chief of the general staff, General Rade Hamovic,
were accused of "having made inadequate defense prepara-
43tions and having a faulty strategic concept".
Hurriedly, the general staff of the army began drawing
up plans to counter a possible Soviet invasion, where
previous planning and officer training had completely ignored
44
this possibility. By November 7, 1968, the new defense
42Reported by David Binder, "Yugoslavs Purge Army
Generals," The New York Times (April 15, 1969), p. 1.
43 Ibid.
44 David Binder, "Yugoslavia Turning Increasingly Toward
West as Result of Soviet Policy," The New York Times
(April 18, 1969) , p. 12.
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bill was finally passed by the federal government and
sent to the Federal Assembly for adoption; it was approved
by the Federal Assembly on 19 February 1969. Again the
delays were caused by the necessity to balance a modernized
defense force with greater republican autonomy. The desire
for the limitation of central government controls by those
wanting more decentralization had to be balanced with the
desires of the traditionalists who saw greater independence
of the republic governments as being detrimental to the
federal government.
After the Soviet invasion, the Yugoslav leaders real-
ized that their military capabilities were inadequate to
defend the country and that developing an even larger con-
ventional standing army was not a feasible solution. The
economic difficulties the federal budget was experiencing
did not permit massive military expenditures. The internal
political system that had begun in the middle to late 1960's,
that decentralized the role from a strong federal government
to the constituted republic governments, did not permit a
concentration of power back to the federal government -
which would have been the case with a large-scale army.
And, had these not been obstacles, the Yugoslavs realized
that their army could not match the highly mobile army of a
major power, and it would have been futile to resist.
The intent of the 1969 law, then, was to face the Soviet
with the probability of extended guerrilla resistance, even
37

if the Warsaw Pact troops managed to destroy the Yugoslav
People's Army in a single blow. But the reformers also
wanted to provide each republic with an armed force of its
own, in the hope of deterring elements in the People's Army
from intervening at some point in the process of decentrali-
45
zation and forcibly reversing it.
The most significant military and political implica-
tions of the February 1969 law extended to every "social
and political unit" the obligation and responsibility "to
organize total national defense and to command the battle
directly." The most important feature of the new doctrine
was that it provided for the population to be integrated
into the active defense of the country under the control
of a hierarchy, independent of the regular forces' chain of
46
command. Moreover, the makeup of Yugoslavia suggested
that the new force be organized on the pattern of the
existing political structure.
By permitting local communities to participate directly
in the defense of the country it was reasoned that the
45Burks , The National Problem and the Future of
Yugoslavia
, p. 22.
46Axel Horhager, "Yugoslavia's Defense," Military
Review, Vol. LVII, No. 6 (June 1977), p. 59.
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concept of self-management, implemented elsewhere in Yugoslav
society, represented the interests of the working-class and
47
each of the republics as nationality groups. Total
national defense incorporates a defense in depth throughout
the country by every able bodied person and poses a deterrent
to possible invaders facing such a broad based resistance.
An attack against Yugoslavia then is an attack against the
Yugoslav road to socialism, of decentralized socialism. The
federal leadership hoped that each republic would realize,
if the system of government falls to invasion, each republic
will suffer; this being the impetus for them to defend the
country against an enemy.
By transferring responsibility for defense to
society as a whole, and not only to a number of
specialized organizations and agencies we have
manifoldly increased our defense capability and
at the same time made a significant step towards
the realization of the idea of Marxist classics
of an armed people. Now in our self-management
society there are real conditions for concern
for our defense to become the right and duty of
all people. This has already become a component
part of life and work in factories and socio-
political communities and organizations, in
schools, and at universities. Needless to say,
defense matters must to a still greater extent
become the subject of study and concern in all
environments.
47Josip Broz Tito, "Basic Factors of Strength in Total
National Defense," Yugoslav Survey , Vol. XVIII, No. 4





By giving the republics more independence and
responsibility for national defense, the army was forced
to relinquish its previous seclusion from local politics
and isolation from the socio-political community. If there
had been political ambitions among the military elite on a
federal level, the opportunities to implement them in the
future began to be checked by those forces in the country
favoring a confederative organization of government. At
the same time, however, that the army came out of socio-
political isolation where it had not previously played a
political role beyond that of national defense from external
threats , the door opened for the regular army to become
the guarantor of Yugoslavia's unity and defender of its
revolutionary achievements.
Under the National Defense Law, the Yugoslav People's
Army provided the operational force of the nation's defense
tasked with meeting the first strike of the enemy force, pre-
venting the enemy's penetration into the country, and allowing
the rest of the country time to undertake total mobilization.
The territorial units under the republics were organized in
all enterprises, communes, provinces, and republics and
tasked with defending the entire country in depth and from
49
all sides rather than just from a frontal battle line.
49 Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage All-Out
People's War in Case of an Attack," Radio Free Europe Research
(November 26, 1968), p. 4.
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The law provided for the territorial defense units to
have their own headquarters and to be completely decentral-
ized both in logistics and command. They became an integral
part of the armed forces, which closely cooperates with the
regular army and under certain conditions under the command
of the operational forces. Being under the control of the
republic governments fully incorporated the territorial
defense units into the socio-political community, as the
financial and logistical support for the territorial units
began to be borne by the local governments.
The third facet of the defense law provided for civil
defense units organized in urban and rural areas by house-
holds, enterprises, and communes tasked with protecting
the population and the material goods of the community.
The total national defense concept, with territorial
defense units made up of the Yugoslav population, also
provided international legal protection for those citizens
52involved in the defense of the country. As Yugoslavs
Milojica Pantelic, "The System and Organization of
National Defense," Yugoslav Survey , Belgrade, Vol. X, No. 2
(May 1969) , p. 6.
Antic, "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage Ail-Out People's
War in Case of an Attack," p. 5.
52Gavro Perazic, "The Yugoslav National Defense Law From
the Standpoint of International Law," The Yugoslav Concept





were now bound by law to fight, the formation of territorial
defense units qualified them as legal organized fighters
protected under international law. The new military concept
involving all able bodied men and women was also based on
unifying the citizenry and the military when facing an enemy.
General Ljubicic expressed the view that
there is not a hierarchy of elements in the system
of nation-wide defense, but a combination of
reactions in which any success by one expands the
radius for action by others; partial failures are
therefore easier to bear and their negative con-
sequences may be more rapidly eliminated.
Difficulties with the 1969 law, which directed the local
authorities to establish their own territorial units and
direct resistance against the enemy in an attack, created
a chain of command problem when regular army units operated
in the territory of a given local command. In the presence
of the regular army, the territorial defense units were
subordinated to the command of the Yugoslav People's Army
unit with which they cooperate in the defense. If the
territory became overrun by the enemy, however, the role of
directing resistance reverted back to the control of the
53Nikola Ljubicic, "General People's Defense - The
Guarantee of Independence for Socialist Yugoslavia," The
Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense (Belgrade:




republic. The National Defense Law of 1974 corrected
this by making the president of each republic the supreme
commander of the armed forces in each republic during war
to ensure a unified direction and control of the military
effort.
The new defense law of 1974 which superseded the 1969
version was designed to standardize organizational practices
and hierarchical relations in the national defense. As in
the previous defense law, the principles of workers' self-
management were used as the basis for territorial defense.
There was a shift of control, however, and the federal
government began to provide more direction for the total
defense system, though local initiative still controls the
territorial forces during peacetime and all forces during
war. The new 1974 law was seen as an improvement in the
balance between local autonomy and federal control of
national defense.




III. YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
It is almost a rule that aggressions are not
tried against those countries and people who are
expected to demonstrate strong resistance and
where the outcome of war would be uncertain for
the aggressor.
The relationship between the Yugoslav People's Army
and the Territorial Defense Force has changed as the
defensive role of each has been redefined. The Territorial
Defense Force was created along republican lines at the
height of decentralization in the 1960's at what the
centralists (those wanting a stronge central government)
felt, was the expense of the Yugoslav People's Army.
Until the 1969 National Defense Law established the
Territorial Defense Force, the Yugoslav People's Army was
the sole defender of the country. It was forced to share
that power by decentralist forces within Yugoslavia who
felt the autonomy of the republics was threatened by the
autonomy they saw the army achieving at the federal level.
Sharing the task of defending the nation did not alter
the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army was still the
ultimate guardian of Yugoslavia's territory. The first line
55Josip Broz Tito, quoted by Dzemil Sarac, Vjesnik
(21 April 1979); Zagreb.
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of defense remained the operational army which was tasked
through its strength and equipment to defend along the
frontiers and frustrate infiltration in the interior of
the country. The Territorial Defense Force was placed in
the position of supporting the operation army's efforts as
the second line of defense.
The Yugoslav defense strategy is to make the country
an armed fortress capable of resisting an attacking force
by using both the army and the Territorial Defense Force.
Yugoslav military leaders recognize that the country
cannot withstand aggression by a superpower (which
they consider to be the worst situation they might face)
but they believe that a total national defense can success-
fully counteract such aggression until assistance from
56
another power could help them repulse the aggressor.
This strategy assumes that the Warsaw Pact will not tolerate
a Western intervention of Yugoslavia, nor will NATO stand
idle and permit a Soviet invasion.
To achieve the defense structure that Yugoslavia needs
the armed forces have undergone a profound reorganization,
not only in the philosophy of how to defend the country,
56Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-





but also in the strength of the military and the size of
participation. In 1978, the operational army, which is
also the cadre for training the territorial forces, con-
sisted of 200,000, 65 percent of which were conscripts.
The air force had 40,000 (7,000 conscripts), and the navy
58(including marines) had 27,000 (8,000 conscripts). The
Territorial Defense Force in peacetime consists of 3,000
instructors; theoretically it can be expanded to 1.5 million
men in 48 hours. The eventual target is 3 million men in
territorial defense units. With the operational army and
the civil defense workers this would amount to 5 million men
59
and women, or 25 percent of the population.
The Territorial Defense Force units are subordinated
to local and republican defense commands but fall under the
command of the Yugoslav People's Army. Since 1972, when
certain rights of the republics were curtailed, the General
Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army was inserted into the
Territorial Defense Force chain of command to emphasize the
role of the Territorial Defense Force as part of a unified
system. Apart from the political curtailments the redefini-
tion of the chain of command was necessary from a military
58The Military Balance, 1978-1979
, p. 32-33.
59Andrew Borowiec, Yugoslavia After Tito (New York










































































































point of view to avoid confusion or conflict between the
operation army and the territorial units.
The Party gave greater influence to the Yugoslav People's
Army over the Territorial Defense Force, but the Territorial
Defense Force units remain politically responsive to their
local and republican political organizations. The local
and republican governments continue to organize and finance
THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
THE REGIONAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS AND


















60Adam Roberts, Nations In Arms, p. 178
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their subordinate defense units as directed by the Yugoslav
constitution and they continued to nominate candidates for
Territorial Defense Force command posts.
Once the relationship between the Yugoslav People's
Army and the Territorial Defense Force began to jell the
role of the citizen-soldier became accepted. The major
features of Yugoslavia's new approach to national defense,
based on the recognition that Yugoslavia needs to be self-
6 2
reliant in defense if it is to maintain its sovereignty,
became set. As a single state Yugoslavia has an institu-
tion involving the entire citizenry in national defense.
The responsibilities of citizenship have been formalized
in the constitution, which states that it is the right and
duty of every citizen to participate in national defense
and that no one has the right to acknowledge or sign an
act of capitulation, nor accept or recognize the occupation
of Yugoslavia. This theme as part of Yugoslavia's national
defense policy has been incorporated with its foreign
61Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," Yugoslav Survey
,
Vol. XV, No. 3 (August 1974), p. 77.
6 2
Dusan Dozet, "The Influence of International Relations
on the Conception of General People's Defense," p. 126.
Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," p. 75.
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policy of non-alignment to develop a Gaullist-like defense
a tous azimuths .
The philosophy behind defense a tous azimuths has been
expressed very clearly by Lt. General Dzemil Sarac, until
recently Secretary of the Conference of the League of
Communists of the Yugoslav People's Army and undersecretary
in the country's defense ministry.
Every country has the right to defend itself
against aggression, regardless of which side
it might come from... . Aggression remains
aggression, and occupants remain occupants,
regardless of what flag they wave or what
slogans they try to justify their plans for
conquest. Armed resistance against any
military intervention or aggression is the -.
natural right of every people and every country.
Yugoslav military leaders believe that the operational
army is capable of halting an attack by a neighboring
country that does not have full support from a superpower.
They recognize that such aggression, though, might require
progressive reinforcement of the operational army by the
territorial army. In this situation, territorial units
would operate together with the operational units within
the span of a front under a unified command of the Yugoslav
People's Army. "In this variant the territorial army or




rather its main force would largely perform the function of
an unending source of manpower and means of reinforcing the
6 ^
ranks and supplies of the operational army." Yugoslavia
has neither the means nor the intention to compete with the
world military superpowers. But it does have the intention to
take all necessary measures to equal other European armies in
66
equipment and capabilities in order to defend the country.
General Sarac's comments came in response to the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of
Vietnam. Yugoslavia deplored the fact that nonaligned
socialist countries were involved in wars against each other.
Yugoslavia took this position because it realizes its own
vulnerability. Relations with Bulgaria, for example, have
been cool for some time, and Yugoslavia has had to contin-
ually remind its socialist neighbors of its right to defend
itself. While no one in Yugoslavia publically states a
belief that the Soviet Union would invade the country, an
invasion by a superpower hasn't been completely ruled out,
either.
Prior to the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia thought that Western imperialism was the
Savo Drljevic, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-
Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," p. 212.
66Rajko Tanaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We
Will Defend Ourselves] Nedeljne Informativne Novine , Vol
1468 (15 February 1979), p. 11.
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threat which the military would have to defend against. The
defense doctrine was reoriented, however, to a defense from
all points when evidence showed the possibility of Yugoslavia
being attacked from the east. The Yugoslavs now consider
a blitzkrieg attack by either superpower as the major threat
to their defense, and it is against just such an attack that
Yugoslavia has prepared.
The military believes aggression would begin by an air
attack to the most important targets in the depth of the
country, quickly followed by an assault of armored and
mechanized forces in selected directions, combined with
6 7
airborne troops attacks, and air support. Such an attack
could take place in conjunction with a major power maneuver
and an aggression could be launched in a matter of hours.
An air attack would precede, to neutralize as many counter-
force targets as possible, achieve air superiority, and
assist the ground attack. This would prepare the way for
a joint armor assault against the forwardly deployed Yugo-
slav People's Army. Airborne and airmobile troops would
assault the major cities after the cities had been fired
upon from the air and by artillery. The outer limits to
the size of such an attacking force, well-equipped with
67Nikola Ljubicic, Total National Defense - Strategy of
Peace (Belgrade: NIRO "Komunist ," 1977) p. 162.
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modern technical means, would be approximately 8 soldiers
per square kilometer. This would require a force of at
least two million men, which is over two-thirds of the
total peacetime armed forces now at the disposal of even
the greatest military powers.
Under such an attack the operational army of the
Yugoslav armed forces would offer maximum resistance to
provide the rest of the country time to mobilize. It would
then gradually transform itself into smaller units at the
front and the rear to conduct a largely partisan-type war.
Certain units in the Territorial Defense Force are prepared
to mobilize and receive a combat task within hours of
. . . 69
notification. The distinction between the operational
and the territorial army would largely be eliminated and
the operational army would merge with the territorial units
and other elements of the resistance.'
The main part of the territorial units would be trans-
formed into a new operational formation, while a considerable
section would remain as part of minor territorial units for
local defense. The new operational army would operate within
68
Nikola Ljubicic, Total National Defense - Strategy
of Peace
, p. 135.





the republican framework or be used according to strategic
needs throughout the country. This form of deployment would
provide for an operational army and scattered territorial
units, the goal being to preserve the main part of the
operational army. Nationwide resistance, however, would be
permanent even if total partisan warfare had to be resorted
to.
70
Yugoslavia, however, cannot muster an army large
enough to oppose a major bloc invasion. The strategy then
is to create a territorial defense comprised of various
territorial units which would carry operations against the
enemy. These operations would influence the opposition
provided by units of the operational army at the front, long
enough to permit another major political bloc comes to
71
assist in the defense.
To provide the manpower for total national defense,
compulsory military service is part of the military obliga-
tion of all Yugoslav male citizens; women are not presently
subject to military service. Men are subject to being
called to serve when they reach the age of nineteen and the
70Jovan Radovanovic, "The Operational Army," The







obligation lasts until they reach the age of twenty-seven.
Military service can be deferred for students in certain
justified cases. Compulsory military service lasts for
fifteen months in the Yugoslav People's Army and eighteen
months in the navy and air force. Students who have com-
pleted the Defense and Protection courses in college only
serve for twelve months in the army. After the compulsory
term of service, Yugoslav citizens are required to serve
in the Reserve Force or the Territorial Defense Force until
72the age of fifty-five.
A proposed law on compulsory military service presently
before the Federal Assembly would modify the present law
73
somewhat. The new law would shorten the required active
service obligation in the navy and air force to that of
fifteen months as it is in the army. This change has been
recommended because the Committee for National Defense,
which proposes the new law, cannot justify the differences
in lengths of service and feels that fifteen months is
sufficient. Another aspect of the law would allow the
recruitment of women into the operational army, "first
72Milan Jovanovic, "Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces,"
Yugoslav Survey , Vol. XX, No. 1 (February 1979), p. 27.
73
"Colonel General Branislav Joksovic, Member of the
Committee of National Defense of the Federal Chamber of the
Assembly of the SFRY," BORBA , 22 December 1979.
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probably in service units and then in fighting units." It
has been stressed that there are presently sufficient
numbers of men for assignments in the armed forces, there
has also been a recognition that women will play a needed
role during wartime when there will not be sufficient
numbers of men, therefore, women require military training.
The third major proposal is the requirement that young
people serve their military service after completing secon-
dary school and before going on to studies at the univer-
sities. This would do away with student deferments and
ease the training difficulties which has been experienced
when training 19-year old men and 27-year old men.
The officer corps is comprised of men who have
completed a military academy for the branch of service
they are entering. Enrollment is based on public competi-
tion and is open to everyone who meets the general conditions
for admission to active military service. In some cases
active noncommissioned officers and warrant officers may
receive active officer commissions. The military academic
courses last three to five years, and a graduate must
serve two years in the Yugoslavia People's Army for each
year of schooling, but not less than six years. If an
officer has completed pilot training he must serve at least
56

fifteen years 74 After the Croatian crisis in 1971 and the
attempt to pass a national defense law by the Croatian
75National Assembly for the republic of Croatia, an effort
was made to establish proportional representation in the
officer corps. In June 1974, it was reported that an
adequate national representation of students had been
76
achieved in nearly all officers' schools.
The nationality composition of the Yugoslav People's





Serbs 41.7 60.5 46.0 33.0
Croats 23.0 14.0 19.0 38.0
Slovenes 8.5 5.0 6.0 8.3
Montenegrins 3.0 8.0 19.0 8.3
Macedonians 7.0 6.0 5.0 8.3
Moslems 6.5 3.5 4.0 4.1
Albanians 6.0 2.0 0.5
Other 4.3 1.0 0.5 ""~
74Milan Jovanovic, "Service in the Yugoslav Armed
Forces," p. 27.
75 Slobodan Stankovic, "Croatian National Assembly to
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ranks in general and in the general ranks in specific as of
77
the latest figures available. In the last decade Yugo-
slavia has attempted to balance the ethnic proportions
within the officer corps of the operational army in order
to alleviate potential ethnic discrimination problems.
The operational army consist of ground, naval, air,
and air defense forces. The ground force is estimated to
have 9 infantry divisions, 21 independent brigades, and
78
30 independent combat regiments. The capability of the
ground force to defend against an invasion, affording
sufficient time for the country to mobilize the territorial
defense force, is dependent upon the attacking force.
While the ground force might successfully hold a defensive
line against a Bulgarian attack into Macedonia or Serbia,
it would be hard pressed to delay a Soviet led, multi-
pronged advance across the central Hungarian plain.
The navy is organized to provide protection along the
Adriatic littoral, among its many islands, and as feasible
along the inland waterways. Its force includes 5 coastal
submarines, 63 coastal patrol boats (including missile and
77 Zdenko Antic, "National Structure of the Yugoslav
Army Leadership," Radio Free Europe Research
, p. 3.
78
The Military Balance, 1978-1979, p. 33.
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torpedo boats), amphibious warfare craft, and mine warfare
79
craft. The air elements of the Yugoslav Air and Air
Defense Force include combat aircraft, transports, heli-
copters, and trainers. The Soviet-built MiG-21 ( FISHBED)
is the primary air defense aircraft while Yugoslav-built
aircraft comprise the bulk of the close air ground support
80
capability. The capability for all-weather or night air
support is poor as it is during night operations.
With the overall limitations of the operational army,
the importance of the territorial defense units is drama-
tized as they may well determine the defense of the
country. The main emphasis on building the Territorial
Defense Force has been on company-size units at the local
level. The size of the unit, however, is determined by
the size of the political community on which it is based.
Small rural communes provide squads and platoons; inter-
mediate ones, companies and battalions; and large
communities provide brigade-size units.
The primary role of the territorial units is the
defense of their respective republics. Beyond this role,
the territorial units may be used throughout the country if
The Military Balance, 1978-1979
, p. 33
80 Ibid, p. 33.
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the situation requires it. The units comprise both ground
and air defense. Units organized by factories are assigned
to protect plants. Larger units such as battalions, bri-
gades, and divisions have been given missions to initially
defend the republics and therefore require greater mobility
8
1
than the small local company-size units.
The composition and distribution of the officer corps
throughout the territorial units is based on equal repre-
sentation of nations and nationalities in individual
republics. Territorial Defense Force officers are trained
as reserve officers in schools for reserve officers. Upon
graduation they are commissioned and their training con-
tinues with their units, where they undergo their annual
training. Annual training normally lasts less than a total
of 60 days and training on weekends is limited to 60 hours
in the course of a year. The number of persons commissioned
as reserve officers depends on the number of personnel
needed by the war table of organization of the Armed
Forces.
Territorial Defense Force units are primarily armed
with light antipersonnel weapons and antitank weapons
8
1
Lazar Djurovski, "National Defense," p. 78.




produced in Yugoslavia. There are still some small arms
which were captured during the Second World War, but for
the most part, they have been copied or improved upon for
present use. Heavier mobile antitank and antiaircraft
weapons are found in battalion-size or larger units. Train-
ing is provided by the operational army and it includes
weapon systems used by foreign armies which could conceiv-
ably be captured in the event of war. In a recent interview,
Colonel-General Rajko Tanaskovic, Commandant of the Terri-
torial Defense Force of the Federal Republic of Serbia,
asserts that even though Yugoslavia doesn't have all of the
most modern weapons in its military inventory, there are
people in Yugoslavia who know how to use them and how to
8 3train others in their use. To shorten the mobilization
time, personal military equipment is stored at home,
and weapons and unit equipment are stored in unit armories.
The augmentation of sophisticated weaponry such as night
vision devices, laser-target devices, sensors, and mobile
communication equipment, for the territorial units is
being stressed because the enemy is expected to be prepared
for countermsurgency operations.
8 3
Rajko Tanaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will
Defend Ourselves]
, p. 11.
84Aleksandar Tijanic, "How We Are Armed," Nedeljne
Informativne Novine, Vol. 1511 (23 December 1979), pp. 18-19
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Joint military exercises involving the Yugoslav
People's Army and the Territorial Defense Force began
in October 1971. The maneuvers, called Freedom '71, were
extended over the northern half of the country and were
conducted to test the new concept of "total national
defense." The major change in the concept that came out
of Freedom '71 was a reorganized command structure for the
Territorial Defense Force. It was determined that joint
operations required that the General Staff of the Yugoslav
people's Army be incorporated into the chain of command.
The following year, maneuvers were conducted in the
southern region of the country and along the Adriatic
Coast. Major maneuvers have been conducted on the average
of every two years, with smaller exercises being con-
ducted continuously. Major maneuvers have involved all
branches of the military, the territorial units, civil
defense, and the entire population living in the maneuver
8 5
area. In some cases, families have participated on maneu-
vers with the men in the territorial units, performing
combat support duties while freeing the men for combat roles
Profound changes in the role of the Yugoslav People's
Army resulted in the adoption of "total national defense."
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Although there has been tension in the acceptance of the
defense concept, particularly at the beginning, the senior
officer corps has adapted to the new system of national
defense. This adaptation was credited to the overriding
loyalty of the army to the League of Communists and to
President Tito.
With the buildup of the Territorial Defense Force, the
Yugoslav People's Army lost its role as the only military
institution. The buildup of the territorial units has also
sharply lowered the size of the reserve arm of the Yugoslav
people's Army. At present, 80% of the conscripts are
assigned to the Territorial Defense Force after active
military duty. Twenty percent are assigned to the reserves
8 6
or remain on active duty. Additionally, some combat
support duties have been taken up by the territorial units,
8 7for example medical services, which relieves the opera-
tional army of certain responsibilities, but also of
authority and control.
86
A. Ross Johnson, Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 49.
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IV. THE ARMY IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
On election day, November 11, 1945, columns of
soldiers marched to the polls chanting 'armija
glasa partiju' [the army votes for the party].
Some of the columns marched right from one
polling place to another, stopping long enough
to vote at each.
The military has played an important role in the develop-
ment of Yugoslavia since its founding by the Communist Party
after 1941. The army leadership elite was made up of the
leadership of the Communist party and the two organizations
became synonymous throughout the Second World War. After
the war, a brief civilian coalition government was formed
until the Communist Party, supported by the Army,
won the election in November 1945. This symbiotic
relationship has continued throughout the development of the
country and the Yugoslav military has come to occupy a
position of major importance for the country's political
future. This chapter examines the pattern of political
involvement by the Yugoslav military establishment.
The relationship between the Army and the Communist
Party is centered on a common base stemming from the partisan
88





struggle. This sense of identify has mitigated institutional
differences and has prevented institutional rivalry. This
does not mean that there has not been conflict or com-
petition, but the institutional boundaries have been open
because the military and political elite emerged from the
same beginning. The military has a stake in the preserva-
tion of the Yugoslav political system as its leadership
plays a role in the present political process. Any attempt
to explain the political relevance of the military,
therefore must take into account its active involvement
in the Party and other civilian organizations.
The Army has been subordinate to the Party since its
creation, but the overall control has changed in nature as
the organization and values of the Party has changed. As
opposed to assigning political commissars to every unit in
the Army, for example, where political indoctrination and
tactical training were conducted separately, political
controls have been exercised through the chain of command
since 1953. Seen in perspective, the political involvement
of the Yugoslav military has progressed in three stages,
which can more or less be identified with shifts in the
government. These shifts have paralled the shifts from
centralized to decentralized controls in the political




The first stage of the military participation as a •
political actor in the Yugoslav system can be seen beginning
in the postwar period when a strong symbiotic relationship
existed between the Party and the Army. This continued
throughout the late 1950' s, a period of generally centralized
controls throughout society, reinforced by fluctuating years
of perceived Soviet threat. The second stage lasted until
the late 1960's and was characterized by a period of
decentralized controls, greater autonomy to the republics,
little perception of a threat from the Soviet Union, and a
period of declining status and resources for the Yugoslav
military. Robin Remington has described the Army during
this period as a "bureaucratic interest ground under
89
siege." The final stage began in the 1960's with a
greater military involvement in the domestic political life
of the Party and the country.
The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia shocked the
Yugoslav leading elite, and military improvements which had
been discussed for years began to be implemented. And, as
the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the Yugoslavs how
susceptible they were to external attack, the domestic
89Robin Alison Remington, "The Military As An Interest
Group in Yugoslav Politics," in Civil-Military Relations in
Communist Systems , ed. Dale R. Hersping and Ivan Volgyes
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 195.
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turmoil of 1971-1972 in Croatia identified to the leader-
ship a need for greater military participation in domestic
affairs. Military political involvement which
precipitated from these events came not at the initiative
of the Army but at the insistence of Party leaders and
President Tito. In December 1971, Tito stated that the
Army played an internal political role, in Yugoslavia, as
well as one of external security and would be utilized to
suppress a challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav
90
state if events dictated it. The Party newspaper,
Socijalizam , later agreed that it was perfectly normal and
consistent that during the transition from a class to a
classless society the armed forces have both an internal and
91
external function. This was formally recognized in the
1974 Yugoslav constitution several months after President
Tito stated that it was no longer sufficient for the Army to
be familiar solely with military affairs but that it must
also be familiar with and participate in the social,
92
economic, and political affairs of the country.
90Josip Broz Tito, Borba , December 24, 1971.
91Socijalizam 1(1973): p. 41-53.
92Josip Broz Tito, Speech of 8 January 1974, broadcasted
by Radio Belgrade, cited by A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the
Military in Communist Yugoslavia (Santa Monica: The Rand
Corporation, 1978), p. 14.
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Active military participation in the political process,
which has existed to a limited extent prior to the third
stage of involvement, increased both in the Party
organization and in the federal government in the first half
93
of the 1970' s. Recently, Slovenian General Ivan Dolnicar,
previously deputy secretary for national defense, was
appointed general secretary of the State Presidency, with the
rank of federal secretary. In addition to Dolnicar, who
also remains a member of the General Council for National
Defense, there are five other generals on the 11-member
council: General Matic, head of the Commission for National
Defense; General Sarac of the Federal Department for National
Defense; General Daljevic, president of a commission in the
Party Presidium; General Cuic, party secretary in the army;
and General Vujatovic, military economist. Members of the
Council for the Defense of Constitutional Order include
General Nikola Ljubicic, Federal Secretary for National
Defense and General Franjo Herljevic, Federal Secretary for
Internal Affairs. General Ivan Miskovic has been appointed
president of the Council for Civil Defense. Colonel General
Ivan Kukoc was appointed one of the Party Executive Committee
93
• Viktor Meier, "The Marshal's Generals: Tito Installs
More and More Generals in Political Offices," Frankfurter
Allgemeine (15 October 1979), P. 10.
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Secretaries, Major General Vuko Gozze-Gucetic is Public
Prosecutor, and Lieutenant-Colonel General Ljubison Curgus
is head of the Directorate of Civilian Aviation. The Defense
Minister Ljubicic is also a member of the twenty-three
member LCY Presidium.
The expanded presence of military officials in Party
and state executive organizations is the most visible sign of
the enhanced political role of the military. This reflects
both the growth in military influence and the conscious
premise that the military institution imparts a measure of
stability and strength to government institutions and pro-
cesses. In addition, these generals were personally appointed
to their positions by President Tito which reflected on their
loyalty to him without ties to particular republics. They
also attained their rank by way of the political administra-
94tion of the Army rather than command posts, which recalls
the practice from earlier years when the leadership genera-
tion was a direct outgrowth of the partisan struggle when
political and military functions frequently replaced one
another or were even combined.
The status of the Army within the Party organization is
somewhat akin to that of an autonomous province, a position
which is singularly different from any other institution in
94
Meier, "The Marshal's General", p. 20
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the country. The twenty- three member LCY Presidium is com-
posed of three menbers from each of the six republican Party,
two from the two autonomous provinces, and, as noted, one
from the army. In addition to the fifteen seats which are
allocated to the military on the LCY Central Committee, (each
republic was allocated twenty seats and each province
allocated fifteen) , two additional army representatives
have been included in the republican delegations. Total
military representation on the 1974 and 1978 Central
Committees was 17 members, or approximately 10 percent of the
Central Committee membership. The table below shows the
military representation in the LCY Central Committee since
1948 and the increase in representation since the 1970' s.
MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN LCY CENTRAL COMMITTEE95
Percentage of
Date
1978 (Eleventh Party Congress)
1974 (Tenth Party Congress)
1969 (Nineth Party Congress)
1964 (Eighth Party Congress)
1958 (Seventh Party Congress)
1952 (Sixth Party Congress)
1948 (Fifth Party Congress)
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Military positions on the Central Committee integrated
the most important military leaders into the policy-making
process of the Party and gave them a role in the established
political process. Political leadership remains a function
of the League of Communists and those outside of the Party
do not make key decisions. As the decisions which determine
Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy are made within the
League of Communists, the composition of the League of
Communists serves as a rough index of who decides the
allocation of power and resources in Yugoslav society. The
military is a source of conservative pressure and has taken
an essentially loyalty position tending toward the perserva-
tion of existing institutions. With its sizable representa-
tion in the government and the Party it has the opportunity
to influence its interests.
The relative power the military appears to have in the
Party and the government has arisen through general Party
adjustments and the growing independence of the republican
parties. Since the Tenth Party Congress in May 1974, new
party statutes free the Party organization in the Army from
supervision by the republican Parties; establishing the Party
organization in the Army as a coequal. In addition to pro-
viding the Army Party organization with coequal status the
League of Communists also made the Army Party organization
71

responsible for defining and implementing the views and
96policy line of the Central League of Communits. Given
this greater responsiveness to central direction, the Army
Party organization comes under greater Party control since
it represents centrally formulated policies and views. Party
reformers began their efforts in the mid-1960' s to open the
Army to society from fear that an isolated military might
present a threat to the economic and political reforms of
decentralization. As well as discussion of military matters
in the the media for the first time and the Federal Assembly
debating the previously "rubber stamped" defense budget, the
Party organization of the Army was reorganized to limit the
authority of the field commanders by permitting greater
participation by the military rank-and-file. This was done
in an attempt to effect "the real and not formal acceptance
in the Army of the democratic and self-management achieve-
97
ments of society."
96 Dzemil Sarac, "Communists in the Army in Developing
and Implementing the Policy of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia," in Total National Defense in Theory and
Practice , ed. Mensur Seferovic (Belgrade: Narodna Armija,
1975)
, p. 114.
97Sveto Kovacevic, "Conceptualization of the Role of
Communists in the Post-War Development of the Yugoslav
People's Army," Zbornik Radova
,
(Belgrade: Politicka
Skola JNA, 1968), p. 33.
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The Army's expanded political involvement evolved over
a period of time and after changes were made within the Army
organization to insure its subordination to Party control and
adherence to civilian institutions. Changes have been
implemented in the defense policies, the system of Party
control, the Army's ethnic composition, and in renewed
emphasis on ideology in military training.
Emphasis was placed on reorganizing the suborganiza-
tions or basic units of the League of Communists in the
Army. Certain models were abandoned in early 1972 such
as large basic units which were formed on a garrison or
intergarrison basis, 40% of which had 200 or more members.
These basic units are now established on battalion levels,
increasing the total number of basic organizations and
98decreasing the size to an average of 40 to 45 members.
Additionally, there has also been an increased effort placed
on recruiting new members to the League of Communists. In
the period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congress,
45,000 new members were admitted to the League of Communists
in the Army, and across the country almost every sixth person
admitted to the League of Communits of Yugolsavia became a
99
member while in the army.
98 Sarac, Total National Defense in Theory and Practice,
p. 127.
99 Ibid
. , p. 127.
73

Currently, approximately 99 percent of the officers,
95 percent of the senior enlisted men, 65 percent of the
civilians employed by the military, and a considerable number
of the junior enlisted men are members of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia. There are 2,524 basic
organizations in the Army Party organization which admit
twenty to twenty- two thousand members a year.
A strategic task of the League of Communists in the Army
is to establish greater "moral-political" cohesion among the
various nationalities in the Army for the economic, social,
and political stability of the country. The aim is to
increase an interest in and sense of responsibility for the
continuation of the goals of the Communist Party. The
demands on the Army Party organization, as formulated by
President Tito, are that "the League of Communists strive for
human inter-personal relations, for developing all the moral
standards to which the officers and men of the army should
adhere. Further efforts must be invested in fostering
brotherhood and unity, Yugoslav socialist patriotism, high
moral-political consciousness on the part of members of our
armed forces."
Borba , 18 December 1979.
Josip Broz Tito, Interview to the journal Vojno Delo ,
No. 6/73, p. 13.
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For many people in Yugoslavia, particularly the
decentralists from the northern republics of Croatia and
Slovenia who viewed the military as a bastion of Serbian
hegemony, there had to be a national balance in the officer
corps if the Army was going to represent the views of the
Party. The Army's ability to play an important and decisive
role in conformity to the national interest requires a
national balance of officer corps to preserve the Army's
stability and reliability. Vladimir Bakaric admitted after
the Croatian Crisis of 1971 that there was a potential danger
during that crisis which emanated from the officer corps
being 70 percent Serbs. He also said that any socio-
. . . . . 102political crisis could be reflected in the Army.
The military has made efforts to recruit a balance of
officers from throughout the national groups in Yugoslavia
and there have been some accelerated promotions to establish
a proportional representation in the officer corps not only
in total numbers but also distributed throughout the rank
structure as much as feasible. The plan, however, has not
been completely satisfactory because of the Army's lack of
103 . .
appeal in certain sections of the country. Ethnicity, as
102Vladimir Bakaric, as interviewed in Frankfurter
Rundschau , 17 December 1971.





reflected in Yugoslav political culture, is an important
cause and consequence of the imbalance. Serbs and
Montenegrins have traditionally seen the military as a
guarantor of influence and military men from these
nationalities remained in the postwar army to a
disproportionate number compared to other nationalities.
The Croats and Albanians, in particular, have viewed the
Army as a Serbian-dominated institution and have avoided
voluntary military service. The Croats and Slovenes have
also had economic and career alternatives in their more
industrialized republics and have not been attracted to the
military as a profession. Promotion quotas in the Army have
lessened the Serb-Montenegrin dominance, there is an effort
to recruit more men from the working class from across the
country, in 1974 an adequate national representation of
students in all officer's schools was reported, and the
national composition of the reserve officer corps and the
territorial defense units now correspond to the population
104
structure. To a large extent the army's ability to act
as an effective guarantor of internal stability depends upon
the success of these measures to achieve a more equitable
ethnic balance within it.
104Tan jug Domestic Service, 19 November 1973
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While the army's political role has grown significantly
in the last decade, the League of Communists is still the
dominant political force in Yugoslavia and is likely to
remain so. By incorporating the army as a member of the
decision-making process and establishing controls within the
Army the League of Communists has sought to preserve its
dominance. "The Party," Tito said at the 21th session of the
Presidency of the League of Communists," is the one factor
which does have the right to undertake ideological-political
action in all-Yugoslav framework."
All this suggests that the Army has been coopted into the
political process in an effort to narrow the differences
which might exist between the Army and the Party. This has
been done by the Party leadership to strengthen its position
vis-a-vis the republics and their desire for more autonomy.
There has been a weakening of the central political authority
over the past few years as ethnic and regional identity
problems surfaced, though by the nature of the Party as a
political coalition of Yugoslav nationalities there are
inherent weaknesses in the system. By strengthening the
Josip Broz Tito, speech of 21st Session of the
Presidency of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, quoted
in Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 309.
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position of the Army in the Party, the Party leadership has
been able to countervail increased demands for republican
autonomy.
The 1963 Constitution and economic reforms in 1965 gave
each republic the right to shape its economic policy. These
reforms provided economic decentralization and a withdrawal
of the central, federal government from economic decision-
making, though not to the extent that developed republics of
Croation and Slovenia would have desired. The 9th Party
Congress in 1969 gave increased powers to the republican
Party organizations which led to the devolution of political
power of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In
essence, there became not one but six Yugoslav parties
which resulted in the inability of the State and Party
organizations to reach a consensus on national issues.
The desire for even greater republican power came to a
head when nationalism inspired the student strikes in Zagreb
in November and December, 1971, dramatizing fundamental
problems in the Yugoslav system. The nationality tensions
which were expressed not only posed economic and political
problems in the country but they also posed a serious threat
to Yugoslav security.
The Party leadership in Croatia, Tito said, had
pandered to nationalists and separatists. And while he
conceded that many of their complaints were justified it
was unacceptable that they should be posed as national
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(Croatian) questions, demonstrations should not have been
encouraged since there were constitutional mechanisms to
solve such problems. Tito also pointed out that the primary
fault for events in Croatia did not lie in the intentions of
the Croatian leaders but rather in an ideological crisis in
the Party and that the crisis existed in most other
republics as well. While exerting pressure, Tito said that
it was up to the Croatian Central Committee to put their own
house in order and to re-establish unity in conformity with
the line of the Party.
Tito elaborated on his reasons for taking forceful
action to the Council of the Trade Union Federation in
mid-December 1971 by explaining that events in Zagreb had
been moving "little by little towards a separatist line"
and "that if we had not gone into battle now and stopped
(the demonstrations), perhaps in six months it would have
come to shooting, to a civil war."
Shortly afterwards, there was a purge of the Party
leadership in Croatia and there was a weaknening in the
influence held by liberal leaders in other republics. By
the end of the year Krsto Crvenkovski of Macedonia came
under pressure for his liberal views on nationalism and in
106Tito, Politika, 19 December 1971.
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January, 1972, while still de facto Vice-President of
Yugoslavia, was dropped from the Party Executive Bureau on
the pretext that no one should be a member of both bodies.
Stane Kavcic, President of the Slovenian government came
under pressure by Edvard Kardelj at this same time, as did
everyone who opposed Tito's decision to publicly denounce
the Croatian leaders and force their resignation.
In January, 1972, the 2d Conference of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia reorganized the Party Executive
Bureau and reduced it in size from fourteen to eight. Stane
Dolanc of Slovenia, who was in the Bureau's Secretary during
the Croatian Crisis, was named the first Secretary of the new
Bureau, a position which was to rotate annually but which
Dolanc retained for eight years. All persons with
reputations as advocates of republican Party autonomy were
eliminated from the new Executive Bureau.
The contradications denounced by the conference led to
strengthening of Party control and the Party center, and
107
strengthening of self-management. It was argued during
the conference that a strong Party was a prerequisite to
self-management in order to protect the workers from those
who would seek to usurp power for their own personal or class
107 . .Druga Konferenija Saveza Konumsta Jugoslavije




ambition. uo These themes continued throughout Yugoslav
politics until the new Constitution was adopted at the 1974
10th Party Congress, at which time compromises were
introduced.
The compromises, however, were in favor of a stronger
central Party which called for a newly reunited, recentral-
ized, redisciplined, and therefore thoroughly purged LCY
which would reassert effective control over the country's
political and economic life.
The 'federalization' of the Party which had emerged out
of liberalizing and decentralizing reforms of 1965-68 had
enabled certain people, concentrated at the republican level,
to frustrate implementation of accepted Party principles and
programs. More purges took place in the Party throughout the
country prior to the 10th Party Congress, which cleared the
decks for reform.
Changes to the 1974 Constitution, the fourth in less
than thirty years, redefined the role and responsibility
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and defined
who controls the economic power materalized in public
property and social capital. Workers' organizations
108 Ibid., pp. 21-39
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became the central legal entity of the economic system and
prohibited the election of managers or technical staff to
the workers' councils. There was a reforming of the banking
system which excluded bank employees from the bank's credit
committees. More profoundly, however, it established a
political system in which delegations elected delegates who
filled public office, all of whom need to be approved by the
Party, meaning a return to a direct political role for the
Party.
While the self-management system did not apply to the
Army, the Army's basic organizations (some 2,500) did
participate in the political process of electing a
delegation, who would elect delegates to represent the Army
in the communal, province, republic, and federal political
chambers, provided for under the 1974 constitution.
Since the events of the Croatian crisis there has been
a continuous military input into the political system of
Yugoslavia. And, the statutes of the constitution make the
Party organization in the Army responsible for the establish-
ment and implementation of the views and policy line of the
League of Communist; not subject to the political pressures
of local or republic Party organizations. Nikola Ljubicic
elaborated this further by stating the Army has a debt
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to preserve the revolutionary achievements the country has
made and that the Army is a "powerful factor of social
109
stability and cohesion in the nation."
While it is clear, however, that the Army considers
itself to be one of the prime guardians of public order, and
that domestic stability is a requirement for a successful
defense policy, the army professes that it does not wish to
interfere in the internal life of the country. It wishes to
cooperate in society within the lines of the Party tenets and
not in its status as an armed force.
Yugoslavia is a country brought together by control,
but just as importantly, by compromise. The social and
political stability of the multinational state depends upon
federal power respecting particular republican interests.
While the Army has achieved a measure of political influence
over this last decade, it has received it for the purpose of
bolstering the central government's position in the Yugoslav
coalition. The Yugoslav military recognizes that it serves
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The investment of financial funds in the production
of armament and military equipment is socially and
economically justified only in countries upon which
that production has been imposed by someone's threat,
so that they are compelled to produce military
materiel in order to defend themselves.
Yugoslavia's goal of being as self-reliant as possible
in national defense and non-aligned in foreign affairs is
reflected in the approach it has taken to its arms industry
in efforts to equip the military. The country's leaders
also realize that there is an inverse relationship between
arms dependency on another country and freedom to establish
one's foreign policy, both in the political and economic
arenas. Yugoslavia, therefore, made the decision to develop
112its own domestic capabilities to produce arms. To this
end, the country has placed a good deal of emphasis on the
domestic production of arms and the diversification of
outside sources for those arms it cannot produce.
Nikola Ljubicic, Total National Defense-Strategy
of Peace (Belgrade: Niro "Komunist ," 1977), p. 162.
112Josip Broz Tito, reported by M.S. Handler, "Tito
May End Trade With Soviet Bloc," New York Times (28
December 1948), p. 3.
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After the Second World War, the Yugoslav army was
primarily armed with captured German weapons, some weapons
provided by the Western Allies, and those that the Soviet
Union gave them. Additional military hardware became
available from the Soviet Union upon the conclusion of the
fighting and as Yugoslavia's allegiance turned to Moscow.
At this time Yugoslavia made considerable strides toward
the standard use of Soviet weapons. These arms were
required to support the 500,000-man army that Tito
maintained after the war - needed for both internal and
external security. The June 1948 split with Cominform,
however, halted further assistance from the Soviet Union,
which cut off shipments of both war materials and machinery
for Yugoslavia's armament industry.
By the fall of 1949 Tito increased the size of his
army to 800,000 with an additional 700,000 guerilla
fighters in reserve. This situation forced Yugoslavia to
increase what arms production capabilities it had as
Western governments had also refused to sell it military
113
equipment. Yugoslavia had the ability to produce small
arms and light aircraft which it could expand somewhat, and
it began plans to provide its army with heavy artillery.
113General Ivan Goshnjak, cited in "Russians Cut Off
Arms to Belgrade," New York Times (3 July 1949), p. 3.
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Though its primary objective was to industrialize the
country and to recover from the economic devastation
caused by the war, the few resources available began to be
channeled to the military industry.
Before the break in relations, the Soviet Union was
the sole external supplier of arms to Yugoslavia. Their
interests coincided to the extent that both countries
sought the advancement of world communism and were adamant
in their opposition to Western democracies. The Soviet
Union therefore, was content with contributing arms to
Yugoslavia as long as Yugoslavia was prepared to subjugate
its economic interests to those of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia's demand for arms was not such that it would
have eventually permitted a state of independence.
Yugoslavia, likewise, had held the Soviet model of Marxism-
Leninism up for emulation, there had been a historical
closeness between brother Slavs, and the Yugoslav military
establishment had turned to the Soviet military for train-
ing and guidance. In short, except for the limited
domestic production of light weapons, the Yugoslav leader-
ship was satisfied with receiving arms from the Soviet
Union and expending its resources for the domestic
production of capital goods in its own heavy industry.
The Soviet Union had planned to exploit the resources
of Yugoslavia, as it was doing to the other Eastern
European countries, and had exacted economic conditions
86

from Yugoslavia which had prevented industrial development
from taking place there. When Yugoslavia challenged the
Soviet plan to subjugate Yugoslavia, Tito was branded as
a Marxist revisionist by the Moscow leadership, Yugoslavia
was ousted from Cominform, all assistance was stopped,
and the likelihood of an invasion of Yugoslavia by the
114Soviet Union became real. Yugoslavia during this time
had also denounced Western imperialism, had territorial
claims against Austria and Italy and had committed repeated
border violations, had provided aid to the Greek communist
movement, and had shot down two US military planes; for
ideological reasons it had no desire to turn to a western
arms supplier nor did the west offer immediate assistance.
The demands of the Soviet Union, therefore, appeared to be
supported by a monopoly position.
Yugoslavia's dilemma was once again finding the means
to provide itself with arms for defense and to develop an
industrial base, in addition to producing food and other
material necessities. The world political environment left
Yugoslavia with limited possibilities for turning to
114
For a complete description of the relations between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union between 1947 and 1953 See
Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost (New York: Viking
Press, 1971), and Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, ed
.
,
The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy, 1948-58 (New York:
The East Europe Institute, Inc., 1959).
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another arms supplier because of the sharp division which
has arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States
and Yugoslavia's previous ties with the Soviet Union. To
amass funds for domestic industries Tito decided, however,
to sell strategic raw materials to Western buyers, since
Yugoslavia could no longer depend on trade agreements
with the Cominform states for equipment and raw materials
essential to the country. The capital requirement even
for these industries, however, exceeded Yugoslavia's
resources so it requested and received a loan from the
International Bank for Reconstruction to develop copper,
lead, and zinc mines to obtain hard currency from the
export of these products. By turning to the West for
economic and commercial assistance and easing the pressure
on industrial development Yugoslavia was in a position to
further develop its domestic defense production.
Relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
continued to worsen after Yugoslavia was expelled from the
Cominform. Yugoslavia began to fear that the Soviet Union
and the other Cominform states might resort to armed
intervention to bring it back in line with Soviet
C.L. Sulzberger, "Further Tito Shift to West is





policy. Coupled with this, the massive droughts in
Yugoslavia during 1950 destroyed the year's crops and
placed a financial burden on all government programs. To
help alleviate the problems it faced Yugoslavia accepted
US provided famine relief, of which part went to support
the army. Domestic affairs, however, constrained the
allocation of resources to Yugoslavia's arms production
which left Yugoslavia short of needed supplies.
Yugoslavia had one of the best trained guerilla
armies in the world, though it was weak in air, armor,
and artillery. Additionally, a great deal of the equip-
ment on hand was obsolete and under a Soviet attack there
would be no spare parts available for the Soviet equipment
Yugoslavia owned. In response to this disquieting
situation, Tito explicitly stated:
I can say this, we won't care what anyone says.
If the opportunity comes to obtain arms to defend
this country - material which we cannot manufacture
at home - we will accept it. In an emergency,
we'll ask for, ^military equipment) wherever we
can get it."
In an effort to bolster the defenses of Yugoslavia and
modernize the army against the eventuality of a Soviet
116M.S. Handler, "US Offers Aid to Yugoslav Troops,"
New York Times (21 November 1950), p. 20.
117The New York Times (21 August 1949), p. 1.
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invasion, Marshal Tito signed a military assistance
agreement in November, 1951, with the United States.
The agreement did not, however, bind the two countries
militarily in the form of a defense pact or alliance. The
US agreed to grant military assistance on the basis of
individual requests by the Yugoslav government with a
clause which reserved the right to suspend assistance at
any time Yugoslavia used the equipment for other than
118defensive purposes.
The factors that influenced Yugoslavia to acquire
weapons from the West, and from the United States in part-
icular, were based on several requirements. World War II
and the resulting change in government placed a heavy
strain on the internal stability of the country. There had
been a history of conflict among the ethnic nationalities
of Yugoslavia which came to a peak during the war, with a
large percentage of the war dead caused by fellow
Yugoslavs. Tito's new government quickly found that the
attachments to national cultures, traditions, and interests
were not easily dissolved and Yugoslavia remained a mosiac
on the verge of falling apart. Tito had maintained his
118
"Military Assistance Agreement with Yugoslavia,"
The Department of State Bulletin , vol. XXV, no. 648
(26 November 1951), p. 863.
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army basically intact, therefore, to insure domestic order
while trying to bring the country together by stressing the
ideology factor. When the rift with the Soviet Union came
about, the communist doctrine in Yugoslavia came under
pressure, but the possibility of an external conflict
quickly drew national attention and provoked the call for
independence, sovereignty, and nationalism.
Up until the 1948 split, the Soviet Union had met the
Yugoslav demand for arms in order to impose political
influence and extract natural resources from Yugoslavia to
support Soviet industrial development. After the economic
and ideological break between the two countries, the Soviet
Union felt that an arms and trade embargo would force
Yugoslavia to meet Soviet demands.
To retain national support and direct attention from
domestic problems, Tito increased the size of the army and
cautioned the country to be aware of an invasion. Since
reliance was being placed on the military to insure
the viability of the government and the state, the demand
for arms was great.
Yugoslavia continued to stress its independence though
the United States had hoped that aid to Yugoslavia would
inevitably draw Yugoslavia toward the West. Relations
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union improved, however,
after the death of Stalin. To meet its security needs,
Yugoslavia expanded its domestic defense industries and
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began accepting military assistance from the Soviet Union
in an effort to diversify the outside sources of arms. As
assistance increased from the Soviet Union the United
States cut back its assistance and as Soviet assistance
decreased the United States increased military assistance.
After this pattern of relations occurred again Tito asked
that the US military aid program be terminated, as it was
disruptive to Yugoslav affairs. In March, 1958, the US aid
program stopped, though Yugoslavia was permitted to
purchase arms from the United States on a case by case
basis.
This arrangement has been maintained since, though the
United States and its Western allies have assured the world
community that Yugoslav defense efforts would receive all
the material assistance they required, short of troops,
119
should events warrant such assistance.
The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
reminded the Yugoslavs once again of the importance of
being self-reliant in arms production; this realization
prompted the expansion of the domestic arms industry in
Yugoslavia. The reason for domestic production was stated
119The Times (28 November 1968); London
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more explicitly by Deputy Secretary for National Defense,
General Dusan Vujatovic, at an arms exhibition outside
Belgrade in 1973.
The supply of armaments on the world market has
always been uncertain: political conditions,
demands for political concessions, even blackmail,
have always been possible. Therefore, we decided
to build our own war industry.... ,We didn't want
to have to depend on anybody else.
Most of the weapons produced by Yugoslavia have been
small arms as the infantry makes up most of the defense
force, and it has been reported that Yugoslavia is able
121to produce 80 percent of the country's combat needs.
Yugoslavia also produces or co-produces combat aircraft,
armored personnel carriers, and a wide range of naval
craft, to include medium-sized submarines, with varying
degrees of success. None of the major pieces of equipment,
however, are solely produced by Yugoslavia.
The most recent armored personnel carrier (M980), for
example, uses the same engine and some other components as
the French-built carrier, AMX-10P. The submarines rely
heavily on Soviet electronic equipment and armament; the
most recent fast attack boat is based on a Swedish
120Politika (27 June 1973); Belgrade, cited in Adam
Roberts, Nations in Arms
,
(New York: Praeger Publishers,
1975)
t p. 195.
-"-^Rajko Tonaskovic, "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We
Will Defend Ourselves], p. 11.
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design, carries Soviet missiles, and is powered by Rolls-
Royce engines. Yugoslavia's two earlier jet aircraft
("Galeb" and "Jastreb" ) are powered by Rolls-Royce,
engines, and its newest jet ("Orao") is currently powered
by Rolls-Royce, though the military has been shopping for
122another powerplant. The problem that presents itself
is that although Yugoslavia produces these weapon systems,
it is still dependent upon the world market to make them
operational.
Yugoslavia has found that licensed production of its
domestic models is extremely expensive because production
runs are too short to be cost-effective. It has also
taken longer to develop efficient models than would have
been required to acquire an already existing model
123
abroad, and empirical data shows that supplying
countries tend to charge higher prices for parts than they
do for complete weapons. The expense to the Yugoslav
defense components from abroad and foreign dependence on
the availability of components.
12 Jane's Weapons Systems, 1979-80 ; Jane's Fighting
Ships, 1979-80 ; and Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1978-
79 (London: Jane's Yearbooks).
12 3
"Yugoslavia and Romania Are Believed to Have
Problems With a Project for Joint Production of Jet
Fighters," The New York Times (26 September 1976), p. 19.
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Yugoslavia has offset the cost of production and has
improved its balance of payments somewhat by selling arms
to other non-aligned countries. It began series production
of the "Glaeb" jet aircraft for Zambia and Libya in the
early 1970' s, along with the "Jastreb" jet aircraft to
Zambia at the same time. The "Orao" jet aircraft was
co-produced with Romania and is still in the production
stage. The earlier armored personnel carrier (M60) has
been exported to Cyprus, and artillery pieces and small
naval vessels have been supplied to Algeria, Egypt, Sudan,
124Ethiopia, India, Burma, and Indonesia. The Chief of
the Center of All Advanced Military Schools in Yugoslavia,
General Rahmia Kadenic, stated in a recent speech:
The export of arms and military equipment has
greatly increased since 1974. A very significant
aspect of co-operation in military-economic
relations between our country and the non-aligned
states is reflected in a rapid expansion of
investment contracts in the field of military
and military industrial projects, which we have ,-j.
been constructing in some non-aligned countries.
General Ljubicic reported in December, 1979, that the
export of arms and military equipment to non-aligned and
other developing countries covers 72 percent of Yugoslavia
costs of the import of military technology. This amounts
124
Jane's Weapons System, 1979-80
125Borba (12 April 1979).
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to 3.6 percent of Yugoslavia's overall annual export, and
goes up to the 16.6 percent of exports to non-aligned
12 6
and developing countries.
Yugoslavia has limited its dependence on arms
suppliers to some extent by buying what it can from a
number of supplying countries, but has relied heavily upon
the Soviet Union since the early 1960's.
For example, Yugoslavia does not produce enough heavy
armor to be self-reliant; it is still dependent upon the
Soviet Union for this type of weaponry. In the past it has
also looked to the Soviet Union for anti-tank weapons. In
the last five years, however, Yugoslavia has turned to the
United States for the purchase of advanced weapons and
combat support equipment, to include precision guided
munitions.
As the transition of leadership in Yugoslavia takes
place there is no doubt that a reevaluation of some of
Yugoslavia's defense procurement policies is underway. One
conclusion might be that it is not very likely that a
country which might use an armor invasion against
Yugoslavia would continue to supply anti-tank weapons to
126Borba (19 December 1979)
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Yugoslavia when it needs them most. While it may not seem
likely to some that the Soviet Union will be tempted to
invade Yugoslavia now that Tito has left the scene,
Yugoslav military planners have contingency plans for just
such a scenario, and they again turned back to the West as
a source for equipment.
The reasons for Yugoslavia's desire to acquire arms
abroad have not changed since it broke from the Soviet
Union in 1948. Its domestic industries cannot provide for
the country's needs, and the factors influencing those
needs still exist. The potential for external and internal
conflict varies from time to time, but the potential for
both still exists. The role of the military in Yugoslav
politics has increased over the last decade and the demands
for a modernized military along with it. The demand for
weapons has also increased to meet the requirements of the
recently organized territorial defense force.
The pressure from the superpowers has not made the
situation any more bearable. With the increased presence
of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean and its loss of
port facilities at Vlore, Albania in 1960 and Alexandria,
Egypt in 1972, there has been an increased Soviet desire
for a warm water port in Yugoslavia. The desire that
Yugoslavia remain independent and non-aligned has spurred
American willingness to "arm Yugoslavia.
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An inflation rate of 30 percent has badly hurt
Yugoslavia's economy. Increased prices of foodstuffs,
semi-manufactured goods, and building materials, along with
imported oil, has added to a $6.5 billion foreign payment
deficit. The Army is a major consumer of these goods and
inflation has diminished the purchasing power of the Army's
budget which, in the proposed 1980 Federal Budget, is less
127than 6 percent of the national income. Yugoslavia is
able to offset part of the defense spending by producing
80 percent of its armament needs, returning a large part
of the funds back to the Yugoslav economy. Yugoslavia
additionally limits its defense spending by cooperating
with many non-aligned and developing countries in the
production of military equipment. The hardship is
particularly felt, however, when Yugoslavia attempts to
purchase sophisticated, high- technology military equipment
from the West, at a time when the price of that equipment
is influenced by inflation in Western economies.
Yugoslavia is least able to afford additional hard currency
deficits incurred by military spending at a crucial
political period when a strong military could prevent a
possible foreign military threat.
127,, The SFRY Assembly: Debate on Draft of the Federal
Budget for 1980," Front (1 December 1979); Belgrade.
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Tito said on numerous occasions that the military
would be the principal force for stability and unity in
the country after he was gone. The ability of the Yugoslav
armed forces to maintain the sovereignty of the country
depends a great deal on its acceptance by the populace and




The present military system in Yugoslavia has been
designed and modified over the years to meet the defense
needs of the country and the political needs of the state.
The recognition that national consciousness is far more
developed regionally than federally has been a major factor
leading to political and economic decentralization. Once
this program began, however, it was impossible not to
include decentralization of the defense system. The politi-
cal system in Yugoslavia has tried to take into account
the vast differences existing between the nationalities and
work these into a true federation.
The Yugoslav leadership recognized that as a socialist
state Yugoslavia would have to break away from Soviet
dominance in order to maintain the country's sovereignty.
Otherwise, they felt the country would be forced to relin-
quish all idependence. Yugoslavia assumed an international
position of non-alignment and developed its army as a defen-
sive force against outside aggression. When the Warsaw Pact
forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, giving meaning to the
concept of limited sovereignty, the Yugoslav defense author-
ities realized the inadequacy of their existing defense
structure. The army which had remained immured against
reforms associated with self-management, federalization,
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and decentralization found itself subjected to pressure for
republic control and internal reforms. Total national
defense was introduced to alter the organization of the
Yugoslav People's Army in order to meet the defense demands
of a self-reliant middle-size state and to conform to the
socio-political structure of the rest of the country.
The army has been described as the cohesive force bind-
ing the republics of Yugoslavia into a state, but this
characterization is suspect because the army is not the
legitimate power for this role. The legal authority of the
government comes from the doctrines of Yugoslav socialism
and is represented by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.
The army derives its power, therefore, through the acceptance
by the people of the role it plays in supporting the Party
and its doctrines. The military leaders are cognizant of
the defense role and the supranational position the army has
in Yugoslav society. This does not mean, however, that the
army could act as a political power without the order or
cooperation of the Party leadership.
The cooperation and compromise required to hold the
nationalties of Yugoslavia in a federated state runs counter
to the nature of discipline, hierarchy, and responsiveness
to command that is required to run an army. The social and
political stability of Yugoslavia depends upon the central
government respecting the desires of the republics for
autonomy. The decentralization of the 1960s came about
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through compromise on the part of the republics as well as
the central government. The army acquiesced to decentrali-
zation only after it was forced to do so by the federal
assembly. The army has acted as an interest group to
influence the allocation of power and resources in its
behalf, and this in part was found unacceptable to the
republics. The army has not, on its own, balanced its
requirements with those of the republics and it has only
been within the last decade that the army has acknowledged
a mutual dependence between nationwide defense and social
and economic requirements. The relationship between defense
and the economy as expressed by Tito has influenced mili-
tary thinking:
The strengthening of the material capability of
society is especially important to our defense
capability.... The faster we develop our
society's productive forces and resolve the
question of the standard of living and the
social security of our working people, the
more ready and capable they will also be to
defend the country.
If the defense of the country depends upon the economic
viability of society, then the military establishment must
be prepared to subjugate their needs to the general warfare
128Josip Broz Tito, "Significance of Society's Material
Capability to Defense," cited in Milko Cupara, "Nationwide
Defense and Social Reproduction," Vojnoekonomski Pregled ,
No. 5 (Sep-Oct 1979), pp. 97-114.
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and hence, ethnic inequalities in the goods and services
produced and consumed by the different peoples. The
inequalities basically result from an economically backward
and struggling south in competition with a relatively
advanced and prosperous north. Yugoslav leaders have
contended that these inequalities must be lessened in the
129
construction of socialism and communism, but the gaps
have in fact widened over the three decades of Yugoslav
socialism.
Now that Tito is dead, the ability of Yugoslavia to
maintain its present foreign policy, economic and political
growth and control the reins of state depends a great deal
upon the succession of power and the ability of the new
government to maintain internal stability in a multi-
national society. The regime recognizes the need for
popular support and is continuing decentralization and
regional autonomy among its ethnic groups, while making
use of recentralizing mechanisms that work toward assuring
needed country-wide cooperation. In the past, the
communist regime has been generally successful in handling
this contradication and keeping regional conflicts within
129Edvard Kardel j , "For a Dynamic and Continual
Socialism," Socialist Thought and Practice (Belgrade: Niro
Komunist, Vol. XVIII (1978), pp. 13-22.
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limits. Within a complex setting where multiple political
cultures exist, however, an abrupt change in the balance
of controls established by the federal government could
result in domestic unrest.
The League of Communist of Yugoslavia is the main
force capable of preventing the federation's dissolution.
Political stability and instability are ultimately dependent
on the state of mind of society, and it is through the
League of Communists that the various ethnic groups are
best able to voice their basic needs and expectations.
The Yugoslav People's Army has been designed over the
years to support the League of Communists. The army is
subordinate to the party as shown by the reorganization
it has undergone throughout its history to satisfy the
needs of the Party. During the last decade Party control
of the army has been refined under the guidance of President
Tito in order to balance greater political autonomy given
the republics.
The positions that the army has been given in the
government are those dealing with defense and security,
roles for which they are well suited. The army is not
particularly well suited to handle foreign or domestic
affairs or economics and while it has a contributing voice
in these areas, it does not dominate them. In the post-Tito
era the officer corps recognizes that their most important
104

task is the preservation of the Yugoslav state and they




Antic, Zdenko. "National Structure of the Yugoslav Army
Leadership." Radio Free Europe Research , no. 1373
(12 April 1972)
.
. "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage All-Out People's
War in Case of an Attack." Radio Free Europe Research
,
26 November 1968.
Asprey, Robert B. "Tito's Army." Marine Corps Gazette
,
vol. 41, no. 7 (July 1957).
Bakaric, Vladimir. Frankfurter Rundschau , 17 December
1971.
Binder, David. "Yugoslavs Purge Army General." The New
York Times , 15 April 1969.
. "Yugoslavia Turning Increasingly Toward West as
Result of Soviet Policy." The New York Times
,
18 April 1969.
Borba (Belgrade), 12 April 1979.
Borowiec, Andrew. Yugoslavia After Tito . New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1977.
Burks, R.V. The National Problem and the Future of
Yugoslavia^ Santa Monica, California: The Rand
Corporation, October 1971.
"Colonel General Branislav Joksovic, Member of the
Committee of National Defense of the Federal Chamber of
the Assembly of the SFRY." Borba (Belgrade), 22
December 1979.
Dean, Robert W. "Civil-Military Relations in Yugoslavia,
1971-1975." Armed Forces and Society , vol. 3, no. 1
(Fall 1976)
.
Dedijer, Vladimir. The Battle Stalin Lost . New York:
The Viking Press, 1971.
Djurovski, Lazar. "National Defense." Yugoslav Survey ,
vol. XV, no. 3 (August 1974).
106

Dozet, Dusan. "The Influence of International Relations on
the Concept of General People's Defense." In The
Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense
,
pp. 119-129. Edited by Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade:
Medunarodna Politika, 1970.
Drljevic, Savo. "The Role of Geo-Political , Socio-
economic, and Military-Strategic Factors." In The
Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense
,
pp. 194-219. Edited by Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade:
Medunarodna Politika, 1970.
Druga Konferencija Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije [Second
Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia]
.
Belgrade, 1972.
Gabelic, Andro. "The Universal Substance of General
People's Defense." In The Yugoslav Concept of General
People's Defense
, pp. 130-154. Edited by
Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade: Medunarodna Politika,
1970.
Goshnyak, Ivan. Cited in "Russians Cut Off Arms to
Belgrade." The New York Times , 3 July 1949.
Handler, M.S. "US Offers Aid to Yugoslav Troops." The
New York Times , 21 November 1950.
Hart, Jeffery. "Soviet Plans for Balkans." The San
Francisco Examiner , 8 April 1974.
Heren, Louis. "Soviet Troops Heading for Yugoslav Border."
The Times (London) , 26 August 1968.
Hoffman, George W. , and Neal , Fred W. Yugoslavia and the
New Communism. New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
TWZT.
Horhager, Axel. "Yugoslavia's Defense." Military Review ,
vol. LVII, no. 6 (June 1977).
Izborni Sis tern U Uslovima Samoupravljanja [The Electoral
System in Conditional Self-Management]. Belgrade:
Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1969.
Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1978-79 . London: Jane's
Yearbooks, 1978.




Jane's Weapons System, 1979-80 . London: Jane's Yearbooks,
1979.
Johnson, A. Ross. The Role of the Military in Communist
Yugoslavia . Santa Monica, California: The Rand
Corporation, 1978.
. Total National Defense in Yugoslavia .
Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,
December 1971.
Yugoslavia in the Twilight of Tito . Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1974.
Jovanovic, Milan. "Service in the Yugoslav Armed Forces."
Yugoslav Survey , vol. XX, no. 1 (February 1979).
Lehrman, Hal. Russia's Europe . New York: Appleton, 1947.
Lellenberg, Jon L. Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept .
Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute,
October, 1972.
Ljubicic, Nikola. Borba (Belgrade), 23 December 1971.
. Borba (Belgrade) , 19 December 1979.
. "General People's Defense - The Guarantee
of Independence for Socialist Yugoslavia." In
The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense .
Edited by Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade: Medunarodna
Politika, 1970.
. Total National Defense - Strategy of Peace .
Belgrade: Niro "Komunist," 1977.
. "Yugoslav 1978. National Defense." Survival ,
vol. X, no. 2 (February 1968).
Kardelj , Edvard. "For a Dynamic and Continual Socialism."
Socialist Thought and Practice . Belgrade: Niro
"Komunist," vol. XVII (1978).
Kovacevic, Sveto. "Conceptualization of the Role of
Communists in the Post-War Development of the
Yugoslav People's Army." Zbornik Radova .
Belgrade: Politicka Skola JNA, 1968.
Kovalyov, Sergei. "Sovereignty and International Duties."
Prava , 26 September 1968. In Survival , vol. X,
no. 11 (November 1968).
108

Meier, Viktor. "The Marshal's Generals: Tito Installs
More and More Generals in Political Offices."
Frankfurter Allgemeine , 15 October 1979.
Mender shausen, Horst. Territorial Defense in NATO and
Non-NATO Europe . Santa Monica, California:
The Rand Corporation, February, 1973.
"Military Assistance Agreement With Yugoslavia."
The Department of State Bulletin , vol. XXV,
no. 648 (26 November 1951).
Nichols, Peter. "Fears of Russian Drive South."
The Times (London) , 9 October 1968.
Pantelic, Milojica. "The Role of the Armed Forces in
the System of National Defense." Yugoslav Survey
,
vol. X, no. 4 (November 1969).
. "The System and Organization of National
Defense." Yugoslav Survey , vol. X, no. 2
(May 1969)
.
Perazic, Gavro. "The Yugoslav National Defense Law
From The Standpoint of International Law." In
The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense .
Edited by Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade: Medunarodna
Politika, 1970.
Politika (Belgrade), 27 June 1973.
Radovanovic, Jovan. "The Operational Army." In
The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense
,
pp. 270-276. Edited by Olga Mladenovic. Belgrade:
Medunarodna Politika, 1970.
Remington, Robin Alison. "The Military as an Interest
Group in Yugoslav Politics." In Civil-Military
Relations in Communist Systems . Edited by
Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder, Colorado
Westview Press, 1978.
Roberts, Adam. Nations in Arms . New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1976.
Rusinow, Dennison. The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 .
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
109

Sarac, Dzemil. "Communists in the Army in Developing and
Implementing the Policy of the League of Communists
of Yugoslavia." In Total National Defense in
Theory and Practice . Edited by Mesur Seferovic.
Belgrade: Narodna Armija, 1975.
. Vjesnik (Zagreb), 21 April 1979.
Singleton, Fred B. Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia .
New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
Socijalism , vol. 1 (1973).
Stankovic, Slobodan. "Croatian National Assembly to
Adopt Own Defense Law." Radio Free Europe Research
,
no. 0838 Yugoslavia (21 January 1971).
Sulzeberger, C.L. "Further Tito Shift to West is Seen
Hinged on Moscow." The New York Times
,
8 September 1949.
Tanaskovic, Rajko. "Kako Cemo Se Braniti" [How We Will
Defend Ourselves] . Nedeljne Informativne Novine
,
vol. 1468 (15 February 1979).
Tanjug Domestic Service, 19 November 1973.
The Military Balance 1978-1979 . London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978.
The New York Herald Tribune , 2 December 1951.
The New York Times , 21 August 1949.
The New York Times , 22 December 1951.
"The SFRY Assembly: Debate on Draft of the Federal
Budget for 1980." FRONT (Belgrade), 1 December 1979.
"The Strengthing of Defense." Politika (Belgrade),
22 October 1972.
The Times (London) , 28 November 1968.
Tijanic, Aleksandar. "How We Are Armed." Nedeljne
Informativne Novine , vol. 1511 (23 December 1979).
Tito, Josip Broz. "Basic Factors of Strength in Total





. Borba (Belgrade), 24 December 1971.
. Cited by M.S. Handler. "Tito May End Trade
With Soviet Bloc." The New York Times , 28 December
1948.
Cited in Dzemil Sarac. Vjesnik (Zagreb),
21 April 1979
. "President Tito on Total National Defense."
Yugoslav Survey , vol. XVII, no. 4 (November 1977).
. Politika (Belgrade), 19 December 1971.
Quoted in Documents on International Affairs
1951
, p. 379. London: Oxford University Press,
1954.
"Significance of Society's Material Capability
to Defense." Cited in Milko Cupara. "Nationwide
Defense and Social Reproduction." Vo j noekonomski
Pregled , no. 5 (Sep-Oct 1979).
[Speech to 21st Session of the Presidency of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia] . In Dennison
Rusinow. The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 .
Berkeley: University of California, 1977.
[Speech of 8 January 1974, broadcasted by Radio
Belgrade] . Cited by A. Ross Johnson. The Role of
the Military in Communist Yugoslavia . Santa Monica,
California: The Rand Corporation, 1978.
[Speech in acknowledgement of the Degree of
Doctor of Military Science, Belgrade, December 21,
1976]. Yugoslav Facts and Views 108 (February, 1977):
1-22.
.
Vojno Delo , no. 6/73.
Yugoslavia. The National Defense Law (1969), Article 26.
"Yugoslavia and Romania are Believed to Have Problems
with a Project for Joint Production of Jet Fighters."
The New York Times , 26 September 1976.
"Yugoslavia to Reform its Armed Forces." The Times





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Assistant Professor Jiri Valenta, 2
Code 56 VA
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Dr. Richard F. Staar 1
Director, International Studies Program
Hoover Institution
Stanford, California 94305
6. CPT Richard C. Herrick, US Army 10
9244 Red Cart Court
Columbia, Maryland 21045
7. Army Library 2
Room 1A518, Pentagon






















c.l The Yugoslav People's
Army: its military and
political mission.
thesH499
The Yugoslav People's Army
3 2768 000 99231 7
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
^^n
^^^T
